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Executive Summary

Over the last decade, laws codifying national and
international responses to climate change have grown
in number, specificity, and importance. As these laws
have recognized new rights and created new duties,
litigation seeking to challenge either their facial
validity or their particular application has followed.
So too has litigation aimed at pressing legislators and
policymakers to be more ambitious and thorough
in their approaches to climate change. In addition,
litigation seeking to fill the gaps left by legislative and
regulatory inaction has also continued. As a result,
courts are adjudicating a growing number of disputes
over actions—or inaction—related to climate change
mitigation and adaptation efforts.

than the consensus scientific understanding of
what is required to stabilize the climate at an
acceptable level.
yy National and international policymakers have
succeeded in creating some legal frameworks for
climate action. Many nations have laws or policies
addressing aspects of the climate problem, and
the Paris Agreement provided for a catalogue of
national commitments toward the goal of averting
average global warming in excess of 1.5°C and
2°C. Litigants have begun to make use of these
codifications in arguments about the adequacy or
inadequacy of efforts by national governments to
protect individual rights vis-à-vis climate change
and its impacts.

This report provides judges, advocates, researchers,
and the international community with an of-themoment survey of global climate change litigation,
an overview of litigation trends, and descriptions of
key issues that courts must resolve in the course of
climate change cases. One purpose of this report is to
assist judges in understanding the nature and goals of
different types of climate change cases, issues that are
common to these cases, and how the particularities
of political, legal, and environmental settings factor in
to their resolution. Another goal is to contribute to a
common language among practitioners around the
world working to address climate change through
the courts.

Part 2 provides a survey of climate change
litigation and a discussion of evident and
emerging trends:
yy Citizens and non-governmental organizations are
suing to hold their governments accountable for
climate-related commitments. In many instances,
the arguments made to challenge government
actions or inaction include reference to
constitutional and statutory provisions not specific
to climate change. In those cases, references to
international climate agreements, which embody
scientific objectives as well as political ones, often
buttress the claim.

Part 1 describes environmental, diplomatic, and
political circumstances that are making climate
change litigation efforts especially important at
the present moment:

yy In many cases, challenges to a project or policy
identify linkages between resource extraction
and climate-related impacts, both in the form of
emissions due to combustion of extracted fossil
fuels and in the form of impairments to resiliency
and adaptive capacity. These challenges seek to
make those linkages legally significant and either
deserving of consideration or else compelling
an alternative approach to natural resource
management.

yy Impacts such as heat waves and destructive coastal
storms are growing in frequency and severity as
a result of human-cause emissions. The costs to
governments, private actors, and communities of
dealing with these impacts are significant.
yy National and international policymakers have
struggled to develop effective means of addressing
both the underlying causes and the effects of
climate change. Climate change mitigation and
adaptation policies have emerged slowly and have
often set targets based on political feasibility rather

yy Building on scientific understanding of the
relationship between emissions and climate
change, which policymakers (with notable
exceptions) have generally adopted as accurate,
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between the injury and the action (or inaction)
complained of is plausible. In climate change cases,
this sometimes presents a high bar for plaintiffs. As
for separation of powers, particularly in cases that
call on a court to assess inaction by a government
agency, courts must be able to articulate what
authority empowers them to find fault or direct
the agency to revise its approach.

several cases seek to establish liability for entities
that generate emissions with full knowledge of
those emissions’ effects on the global climate.
yy Technical understanding of climate change and
the quality of predictions about future temperature
and weather patterns are improving. Recognizing
that adaptation efforts have not kept pace with
these improvements, litigants are bringing claims
that seek to assign responsibility where failures to
adapt result in foreseeable, material harms.

yy Sources of climate obligations: Climate change
litigation can draw on various sources of
legal authority, including international law,
constitutional provisions, statutes, or common law.
In some cases, plaintiffs identify more than one
of these, or a combination of them, as providing
the legal basis for their claims. In instances where
a statutory provision spells out climate change
mitigation commitments and that statute also
authorizes citizens to sue for noncompliance,
the task of applying the law to the facts alleged
is straightforward. But in cases where plaintiffs
ask a court to apply a legal authority that does
not expressly contemplate application to climate
change, the task is harder and courts tread carefully,
lest they be seen as legislating.

yy Litigants are making arguments for climate action
based on the public trust doctrine, which assigns
the state responsibility for the integrity of a nation’s
public trust resources for future generations. Such
claims raise questions of individuals’ fundamental
rights and intergenerational equity, as well as
concerns about the balance of powers among
the judicial, legislative and executive branches or
functions of governments.
yy Recognizing that both slow-developing and
acute environmental stresses push individuals and
communities to migrate, the impacts of climate
change are certain to generate migration within
and across national borders. Cases brought to
resolve issues arising from such migration have
already been brought, and more are likely to come.

yy Remedies: Courts can only grant remedies
authorized by the law. If the remedy sought is
more aggressive climate action on the part of
a government agency, courts must identify the
basis for instructing that agency to comply, or else
to specify how exactly the agency should alter its
approach.

yy Most climate change litigation to date has
proceeded in courts in developed countries in the
northern hemisphere and in Australia and New
Zealand. Litigants and courts in the Global South
are beginning to make use of burgeoning climate
change litigation theories and know how.

Summaries of highly significant cases appear
throughout this report. Those summaries provide a
kaleidoscopic snapshot of the current state of climate
change litigation, and also illustrate the circumstances,
trends, and issues discussed in Parts 1, 2 and 3.

Part 3 describes three categories of legal issues
that tend to be disputed among the litigants
involved in climate change litigation:
yy Justiciability: Whether a case is justiciable—
meaning, whether a court has the authority to hear
and resolve the claims raised—turns on questions
of the plaintiff’s standing and on the court’s role
relative to that of the government’s other branches.
Although standards vary, courts generally only
grant standing if the alleged causal connection
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In the 2010s, laws codifying national and international
responses to climate change have grown in number,
specificity, and importance.1 As these laws have
recognized new rights and created new duties,
litigation seeking to challenge either their facial
validity or their particular application has followed.
So too has litigation aimed at pressing legislators and
policymakers to be more ambitious and thorough
in their approaches to climate change. In addition,
litigation seeking to fill the gaps left by legislative
and regulatory inaction has also continued. This
report surveys the current state of this global climate
change litigation, and provides judges, advocates,
researchers and the international community with
an overview of trends and issues in climate change
lawsuits.

Goals (SDGs) enumerated in the United Nations’
Transforming Our World – the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. (Climate action is also
a vital, cross-cutting element of many of the other
SDGs.) Part 2 provides a snapshot of the current
state of worldwide climate change litigation. It also
describes a number of salient current trends in this
litigation and likely future ones. Part 3 discusses
the recurring legal issues at play in climate change
litigation around the world. Strict and comprehensive
categorization is made difficult by the diversity
of the world’s legal systems, which take varied
approaches to the interconnected substantive areas
of law that constitute climate change law—namely
environmental law, natural resources law, energy
law and land use law, as well as constitutional law,
administrative law and common law. Nonetheless,
this section offers legal professionals, researchers
and others an introduction to the common issues
that arise in climate change cases when determining
justiciability, interpreting legal rights and obligations,
and providing remedies. Summaries of highly
significant cases appear throughout the report,
putting these circumstances, trends, and issues into
context.

Part 1 of this report notes the circumstances that
make climate change litigation efforts especially
important just now—most especially the growing
urgency of the climate crisis, ratification and entry
into force of the Paris Agreement under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“Paris Agreement”), and the inclusion of climate
action as one of the 17 Sustainable Development
1

E. Somanathan et al., National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions,
in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution
of Working Group III [WG3] to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1049, 1050–51 (O.R.
Edenhofer et al. eds. 2014) [hereinafter IPCC AR5].
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1. Part
1: Importance
The Importance
of Climate
Change
Litigation
Part
1: The
of Climate
Change
Litigation

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development

Concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the
atmosphere have already surpassed levels that many
scientists consider safe, putting people everywhere
in peril. The extraordinary risks posed by climate
change are well-established. Sea levels are rising,
making more seawater available for the storm surges
that wreak destruction on coastlines during coastal
storms and threatening to overwhelm coastal
communities and small island nations.2 Average
temperatures are rising and heat waves are growing
longer and more intense, threatening to strain
infrastructure and agricultural systems, and posing
direct threats to human health.3 In addition, more
powerful storms, longer-lasting and more severe
droughts, and acidifying oceans have already begun
to disrupt local and regional economies that rely on
having predictable access to particular resources and
markets.4 The need to address these risks is front and
center in the Sustainable Development Goals, the
international community’s vision for a sustainable
future for the planet and its inhabitants. Yet, despite
broad scientific consensus on the human causes
2
3
4

of climate change and the risks of climate impacts
to human communities, and despite the profound
international accord forged through the Paris
Agreement and the SDGs, progress toward effective
solutions has been slow.
The international community has encountered
difficulty in tackling climate change because it is a
“super wicked” policy problem, capable of resisting
even substantial efforts by policymakers.5 Three
features in particular make the problem “super
wicked.” First, it becomes less tractable over time.
That is, the more GHGs we emit, the more committed
we are to continuing emissions, the more severe the
problem becomes and the less likely we are to find
an acceptable solution. Second, the actors who are
best positioned to address climate change are those
who are primarily responsible for causing it—and
who lack incentives to take action. This problem
is made worse by an important asymmetry. Those
with incentives not to mitigate climate change, such
as the companies that own leases to extract coal or
other fossil fuels, tend to have concentrated interests
and good access to relevant information. Meanwhile,
those most likely to bear the burdens of adaption,
including the many millions of individuals who live

John A. Church & Peter U. Clark, et al., Ch. 13: Sea Level Change, in IPCC
AR5.
Thomas Bruckner, Igor Alexeyevich Bashmakov & Yacob Mulugetta et al.,
Ch. 7: Energy Systems, in IPCC AR5; Kirk R. Smith & Alistair Woodward, et al.,
Ch. 11: Human Health: Impacts, Adaptation, and Co-Benefits, in IPCC AR5.
IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working
Groups I, II and III to IPCC AR5, at 64–73 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC SR5].
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Richard J. Lazarus, Super wicked problems and climate change: Restraining
the present to liberate the future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1160 (2009).
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in coastal communities, have diffuse incentives and
generally lack information about, for instance, the
costs and benefits of alternatives to fossil-fueled
approaches to energy and transportation. Third,
no institution has legal jurisdiction and authority
aligned with the global scope of the problem. As a
consequence, climate change mitigation—and to
a lesser degree adaptation—efforts are often seen
as expensive, unnecessary, futile, and remote from
policies that yield immediate and politically popular
economic benefits.

component of any rational plan of action. The Paris
Agreement provides a crucial legal predicate for
pushing governments that have adopted climateoriented laws to implement them. Until the Paris
Agreement’s ratification, no international instrument
dealt as thoroughly with the coordination problem
of international action on GHG emissions.8
Constituents of countries outside the European
Union (EU) could not point to an authority beyond
their country’s particular constitution, common
law, or statutes—or ratification of international
human rights agreements—to place climate action
within that country into a legally and practically
significant context.9 The Paris Agreement makes it
possible for constituents to articulate more precisely
and forcefully concerns about the gaps between
current policy and the policy needed to achieve
mitigation and adaptation objectives. In ratifying
countries in particular, constituents can now argue
that their governments’ politically easy statements
about rights and objectives must be backed up by
politically difficult, concrete measures like restricting
coastal development, foregoing development of
coal-fueled power plants and imposing fees and
taxes on activities reliant on fossil fuels. Lawsuits
brought in countries where governments have
given express priority to development, such as
Pakistan,10 and in countries where governments
are actively addressing climate change, such as the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, demonstrate
that this sometimes means using the courts to push
for concrete action.11

At the international level, the “super wicked” nature
of the climate change problem may be seen in
the global community’s incomplete participation
in the Kyoto Protocol6 and, more recently, the
insufficiency of the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) submitted in advance of the
Paris Conference and the Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) submitted after to reduce
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at a pace
sufficient to maintain climate stability.7 At the national
level, the United States’ (U.S.) historic and recently
revived ambivalence about addressing climate
change stands out as an especially consequential
example of political coalitions struggling toward
and falling short of policy change. But the U.S. is not
unique for failing to develop and implement policies
that address climate change in a coherent fashion.
Litigation has arguably never been a more
important tool to push policymakers and market
participants to develop and implement effective
means of climate change mitigation and adaption
than it is today. Technological developments and
non-climate policy initiatives cannot be counted
on to stave off climate destabilization. Accordingly,
climate-related law and policy is a necessary
6

7

Has the Paris Agreement changed the role litigation
can play? In general, law embodies a thicket of
agreements among the members of society and
between them and their government. Litigation
serves to test whether particular actions or inactions
are compatible with those agreements. Litigation
also serves to articulate how stated commitments
to defend particular rights must be translated into

See O. Edenhofer, et al., Technical Summary, in Climate Change 2014:
Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to IPCC
AR5, at 33, 104 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds. 2014) (“The Kyoto Protocol was the
first binding step toward implementing the principles and goals provided
by the UNFCCC, but it has had limited effects on global GHG emissions
because some countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not
meet their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a portion
of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement).”).
UNFCCC, Aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined
contributions: an update, FCCC/CP/2016/2, at 11–12 fig.2 (May 2016),
https://perma.cc/SUW9-KXY5.

8

Notably, the Paris Agreement does not address emissions from aircraft or
marine craft.
9 See section 2.2.1 below.
10 Pakistan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, Nov. 6, 2016,
https://perma.cc/QJH8-9EXM.
11 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 below.
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action, notwithstanding changes in the direction
of political winds at home or abroad. The Paris
Agreement by its own terms does not provide
litigants with a cause of action or impose enforceable
limits on member countries’ national emissions.
But it makes it possible for litigants to place the
actions of their governments or private entities into
an international climate change policy context.
Placing actions at the national or regional level into

that context makes it easier, in turn, to characterize
those actions as for or against both environmental
needs and stated political commitments. Ultimately,
while the Paris Agreement does not assign each
country a carbon budget, it does offer a basis for
deducing a budget from national commitments. It
also makes clear that policies leading to net increases
in emissions are disfavored.
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This section provides a summary of the current
state of climate change litigation, including
lawsuits’ location, their categorization, and recent
and emerging trends. It counts as “climate change
litigation” cases brought before administrative,
judicial and other investigatory bodies that raise
issues of law or fact regarding the science of
climate change and climate change mitigation and
adaptation efforts.12 Such cases are often identified
with keywords, including climate change, global
warming, global change, greenhouse gas, GHGs,
and sea level rise. However, the presence of one
or more keywords is not a necessary condition for
inclusion.13 Moreover, the presence of keywords is

also not determinative (Cases that make only passing
reference to the fact of climate change, its causes,
or its effects do not necessarily address in direct or
meaningful fashion the laws, policies, or actions that
compel, support, or facilitate climate mitigation or
adaptation.) Finally, cases that seek to accomplish
climate change goals without reference to climate
change issues are not included. For example,
lawsuits seeking to limit air pollution from coal fired
power plants that do not directly raise issues of fact
or law pertaining to climate change do not qualify
as “climate change litigation” for the purposes of
this study. Thus, this report excludes cases where
the discussion of climate change is incidental to
the holding and immaterial to the future of climate
change law.

12 Cf. Meredith Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of
Non-U.S. Climate Litigation, 26 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y Forum 131, 134 (2015);
(adopting definition of “climate change litigation” developed by David
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 15, 27
(2012): “any piece of federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or judicial
litigation in which the . . . tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an
issue of fact or law regarding the substance or policy of climate change
causes and impacts.”). This definition also guides the collection of cases
included in the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Non-U.S. Climate
Change Litigation chart, available at https://perma.cc/8CKE-KMQU
(accessed Mar. 3, 2017), as well as the Climate Change Laws of the World
database, maintained jointly by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law
and the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics.
13 For instance, the Australian case, Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council
contained none of those terms but dealt with the highly germane issue of
liability of a local government for decisions related to its policy of managed
retreat from sea level rise. [2016] NSWSC 169. The court’s March 2016
denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the Shire Council and its insurers
prompted the parties to negotiate a settlement, which they agreed to in
August 2016. Hans Lovejoy, How a handful of wealthy Belongil residents

2.1 A survey of climate change litigation
As of March 2017 climate change cases had been
filed in 24 countries (25 if one counts the European
Union), with 654 cases filed in the U.S. and over
230 cases filed in all other countries combined.14
won the right to keep their seawalls, Echo Net Daily, Aug. 24, 2016, https://
perma.cc/HXF9-PXV5. Neither the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss
nor the settlement agreement states whether the locality is liable for any
of the claims alleged by the plaintiffs, beachfront property owners who
had wanted to armor their shoreline parcels and who opposed the local
government’s proposed policy of managed retreat.
14 To review these cases, as well as others added after March 2017, visit the
Sabin Center-Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer Climate Change Litigation
databases, available at http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/climatechange-litigation/.
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In regards to the non-U.S. litigation: Australia
has seen more cases than any other non-U.S.
country (80); the United Kingdom and the Court
of Justice of the EU have both seen about half as
many as Australia (49 and 40 respectively); New
Zealand and Spain have both seen about onefifth as many as Australia (16 and 13 respectively);

Austria, Belgium, Colombia, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Micronesia,
the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the
Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Ukraine.15 Both the number of cases in these
countries and the number of countries where cases
have been filed have grown in the past few years: a

Region

Country

Number of cases*

International Court of Justice

1

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

1

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

1

Africa

Nigeria

1

South Africa

1

Australia

80

New Zealand

16

India

2

Micronesia

1

Philippines

1

Pakistan

2

(Court of Justice of the EU)

40

United Kingdom

49

Spain

13

Belgium

1

Germany

3

Norway

1

Switzerland

1

Austria

1

Czech Republic

1

France

4

Ireland

1

Netherlands

1

Sweden

1

Ukraine

2

Latin America and Carribean

Colombia

1

North America

United States of America

654

Canada

13

Asia Pacific

Europe

*The numbers shown here reflect our tally of climate change cases across jurisdictions as of March 2017. It is possible that these numbers omit one or more cases
that have already been filed or decided but have not yet come to our attention.

15 Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Non-U.S. Climate Change Litigation:
Non-U.S. Jurisdiction, https://perma.cc/8CKE-KMQU (accessed Mar. 3,
2017).

and there have been four or fewer cases filed in
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survey of cases decided before 2014 found them in
only 12 countries, including the U.S.16 Nonetheless,
it remains true that “[m]ost countries have
experienced little or no climate change litigation.”17

aggressive mitigation policy have been initiated
from 2015 to 2017.21

With notable exceptions18, governments are almost
always the defendants in climate change cases.19
Government defendants have been called upon
to justify decisions large and small. On the large
end of the spectrum are cases like Massachusetts v.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Urgenda
Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, which
push for more aggressive national climate change
mitigation policies, and Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and West Virginia v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, which challenge the legal bases for U.S.
mitigation policy. On the small end of the spectrum
are cases focused on particular projects, ranging
from the expansion of airports and coal mines, to
the development of renewable energy generation
facilities, to the construction of structures on
eroding coast lines. Whereas the cases aimed
at large targets tend to focus their arguments
on nationally applicable laws governing energy
policy and air pollution, the cases aimed at smaller
targets—which make up the clear majority of nonU.S. cases—tend to focus on environmental impact
assessments and other planning requirements.20
However, several instances of strategic litigation in
non-U.S. jurisdictions that seeks to push for more

Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
International Court of Justice
Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)

Europe
Asia
Pacific

North
America

2.2 Trends in climate change litigation
Recent judicial decisions and court filings reveal
several trends in regards to the purposes of climate
change litigation. Five such trends are described
here: holding governments to their legislative
and policy commitments; linking the impacts
of resource extraction to climate change and
resilience; establishing that particular emissions are
the proximate cause of particular adverse climate
change impacts; establishing liability for failures (or
efforts) to adapt to climate change; and applying the
public trust doctrine to climate change.
1

Climate
Change 2
Litigation:
The
3
Five
4
Trends

16 Wilensky, supra note 12, at 151–52.
17 Michael B. Gerrard & Meredith Wilensky, The role of the national courts in
GHG emissions reductions, in Elgar Encyc. of Envtl. L. 359, 369 (Michael
Faure ed. 2016).
18 Most exceptions are U.S. cases brought against corporations in the fossil
fuel sector. Non-U.S. exceptions include the recent decision in Lliuya v.
RWE AG, Az. 2 O 285/15, issued by the Regional Administrative Court of
Essen, Germany, and the investigation of 50 firms in the fossil fuel industry
(“Carbon Majors”) by the Human Rights Commission of the Philippines.
19 Wilensky, supra note 12, at 138–40; Markell & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 60.
20 Gerrard & Wilensky, supra note 17, at 366, 368 (“Until the issuance of an
important and controversial decision by a Dutch court in 2015, climate
change litigation intended to drive the course of climate change
policies—whether to encourage their development or to halt it—was
noticeably lacking outside of the United States.”); Wilensky, supra note
12, at 144 (“The dominance of the EIA and Permitting Group in non-U.S.
litigation demonstrates an emphasis on tactical suits aimed at specific
projects. . . . In fact, strategic litigation intended to drive climate change
policy as a whole is almost absent outside of the U.S.”); Markell & Ruhl,
supra note 12, at 38–40.

5

Holding governments to their legislative and policy
commitments
Linking the impacts of resource extraction to climate
change and resilience
Establishing that particular emissions are the proximate
cause of particular adverse climate change impacts
Establishing liability for failures (or efforts) to adapt to
climate change
Applying the public trust doctrine to climate change.

2.2.1 Holding governments to their legislative
and policy commitments
As national governments’ political branches
articulate commitments to climate change
21 See infra section 2.2.1 (discussing non-U.S. cases seeking to hold
governments to legislative and policy commitments on climate change).
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The Netherlands
A Dutch environmental group, the Urgenda
Foundation, and 900 Dutch citizens sued the
Dutch government, alleging that the government’s
recent revision of GHG emissions reduction goals
amounted to a violation of its constitutionally
imposed duty of care. The court in the Hague,
agreeing with the plaintiffs, ordered the Dutch
state to limit GHG emissions to 25% below 1990
levels by 2020, finding the government’s existing
pledge to reduce emissions 17% insufficient to
meet the state’s fair contribution toward the goal,
codified in the Paris Agreement, of keeping global
temperature increases within 2°C of pre-industrial
conditions.

on Human Rights; the “no harm” principle of
international law; the doctrine of hazardous
negligence; the principle of fairness, the
precautionary principle, and the sustainability
principle embodied in the UNFCCC; and
the principle of a high protection level, the
precautionary principle, and the prevention
principle embodied in the European climate policy.
The court did not specify how the government
should meet the reduction mandate, but offered
several suggestions, including emissions trading or
tax measures.
This decision was pathbreaking in separation
of powers jurisprudence because it grounded
its instruction to the government to tighten
emissions limits on a rights-based analysis rather
than through reference to statutory requirements.
Subsequent petitions and judicial decisions in
Austria, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden, all
relating to governments’ obligations to mitigate
climate change, have similarly been grounded at
least in part on rights-based theories.

The court concluded that the state has a duty to
take climate change mitigation measures due
to the “severity of the consequences of climate
change and the great risk of climate change
occurring.” In reaching this conclusion, the court
cited (without directly applying) Article 21 of
the Dutch Constitution; EU emissions reduction
targets; principles under the European Convention
mitigation and adaptation through legislation,
regulation, and policy those governments’
administrative agencies may properly become
subject to lawsuits seeking to enforce those
commitments.
The plaintiffs in Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom
of the Netherlands brought just such a suit,
challenging efforts by a newly elected Dutch
Government to back away from the previous
Government’s mitigation commitments.22 The
Hague District Court’s June 2015 decision looked
to the Netherlands’ international commitments,
which did not yet include the Paris Agreement,23
22 Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, [2015] HAZA
C/09/00456689, appeal filed.
23 The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016. UNFCCC,
Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, https://perma.cc/5JCA-KPNR
(accessed Jan. 15, 2017). The Netherlands is only a signatory to the
Agreement and has not, as of this writing, ratified it. Id. The significance of
this non-ratification is muted by the fact that the European Union, which
negotiated at the Paris Conference on behalf of the Netherlands and other
member states, ratified the Agreement on October 5, 2016. Id.

to construe the constitutional duty of care owed by
the Dutch government to Dutch citizens and others,
and concluded that the duty of care prohibits such
backsliding.24
In September 2015, the Lahore High Court Green
Bench issued a ruling in Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan
that was similar in its legal basis to Urgenda, though
it focused on adaptation rather than mitigation
commitments.25 The court concluded that the
government’s failure to implement the National
Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework
for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (20142030) “offends the fundamental rights of the citizens
which need to be safeguarded.”26
24 Urgenda, para. 4.70.
25 Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015.
26 Id. para. 8. The court construed these rights as follows: Environment and
its protection has taken a center stage in the scheme of our constitutional
rights. . . Right to life, right to human dignity, right to property and right to
information under articles 9, 14, 23 and 19A of the Constitution read with
the constitutional values of political, economic and social justice provide
the necessary judicial toolkit to address and monitor the Government’s
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Pakistan
In September 2015, an appellate court in Pakistan
granted the claims of Ashgar Leghari, a Pakistani
farmer, who had sued the national and regional
governments for failure to carry out the National
Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework
for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (20142030). The chief concerns of the plaintiff—and the
court—were with the need for adaptation efforts:
“As Pakistan is not a major contributor to global
warming it is actually a victim of climate change and
requires immediate remedial adaptation measures
to cope with the disruptive climatic patterns.”
According to the court, “the delay and lethargy of
the State in implementing the Framework offend
the fundamental rights of the citizens,” as codified
in articles 9 (right to life), 14 (human dignity), 19A
(information), and 23 (property) of the Pakistani
constitution.
As a remedy, the court 1) directed several
government ministries to each nominate “a
climate change focal person” to help ensure the
To vindicate those rights, and in particular
to require active responses to an emerging
pattern of “heavy floods and droughts,”27
the court ordered the executive branch to,
among other things, establish a Climate Change
Commission to facilitate climate action.28

implementation of the Framework, and to present
a list of action points by December 31, 2015; and 2)
created a Climate Change Commission composed
of representatives of key ministries, NGOs, and
technical experts to monitor the government’s
progress. On September 14 the court issued a
supplemental decision naming 21 individuals to
the Commission and vesting it with various powers.
This case is an example of litigants grounding
claims in a statutory and policy framework that
articulates governmental responsibilities with
respect to climate change. As the court observed,
the responsible government ministry had spelled
out 734 “action points” and identified 232 of those as
deserving priority. Had the government not spelled
out in such detail what should be done to help
citizens deal with climate change, it would have
been more difficult for the court to conclude that
the government’s failure to implement applicable
law and policy fell short of protecting Leghari’s
constitutional rights.
which was still pending as of March 2017,29
largely tracks that of the Urgenda decision. The
New Zealand case, Thomson v. Minister for Climate
Change Issues, challenged the adequacy of that
country’s INDC, which the petitioner alleged fell
short of the emissions reductions required by New
Zealand’s Climate Change Response Act of 2002.30
A stated purpose of the 2002 Act is to “enable
New Zealand to meet its international obligations
under the [UNFCCC].”31 As the petitioner explained,
New Zealand’s INDC “equates to a reduction of
11% below New Zealand’s 1990 emission levels by
2030”—a mitigation effort that “will not, if adopted
by other developed countries in combination with
appropriate targets set by developing countries,
stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a

Belgium and New Zealand also saw pre-Paris
Agreement cases filed alleging failures by their
respective governments to adhere to stated
national commitments. The theory of the Belgian
case, VZW Klimatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium,

response to climate change. Id. para. 7.
27 Id. para. 6.
28 The first of these was the designation of government officials in key
ministries who would thereafter “work closely with the Ministry of
Climate Change.” Id. para. 8(i). Another was identification of “adaptation
action points,” selected from among the 734 “action items” listed in the
Implementation Framework, that could be achieved by the end of 2015.
Id. para. 8(ii). Finally, the court also called for the creation of a Climate
Change Commission, whose members would include officials from key
ministries as well as representatives of NGOs and technical experts, “to
assist this Court to monitor the progress of the Framework.” Id. para. 8(iii).

29 Klimaatzaak.eu, L’Affaire Climat: Le Procès, https://perma.cc/4X4D-SX8F
(accessed Jan. 15, 2017) (reporting that the court has yet to specify a
schedule for submission of pleadings or conduct of a hearing). Klimaatzaak
is Dutch for “climate case.”
30 CIV-2015-__ (High Court).
31 Climate Change Response Act 2002 § 3(1)(a).
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level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”32 The High
Court of New Zealand had as of March 2017 yet to
issue a judgment in that case.

goal of preventing ‘dangerous disruption of the
climate system’” by stipulating warming thresholds
of 1.5°C and 2°C above preindustrial levels.37
Taking this as the scientifically and legally
stipulated touchstone for Switzerland (and
others), the petitioners allege that Switzerland
is not on pace to meet its commitment, and
that—unlike Swiss compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol, which relied heavily on the purchase
of emissions offsets—physically and legally
adequate mitigation measures require actually
reducing net emissions from Swiss sources.38
Petitioners in three other European cases, one
dealing with the expansion of Vienna’s airport (the
“Austrian case”), Greenpeace Nordic Association v.
Norway Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, and PUSH
Sweden v. Government of Sweden, also assert that
their respective governments’ legal commitments
to climate change mitigation are consistent with
and articulated through ratification of the Paris
Agreement.39

The Paris Agreement is emerging as a novel and
unique anchorage for law suits of this sort. That
Agreement integrates national commitments—the
INDCs/NDCs—into an international instrument that
links them to the common goal of averting warming
in excess of 1.5°C and 2°Ctemperature thresholds.33
This linkage does not answer technical questions
about how to allocate carbon budgets, but it does
give some shape to national commitments, even
if those commitments are vaguely worded. It also
undermines arguments that increments of difference
in one nation’s contributions are immaterial to
global mitigation and so are not legally cognizable.34
Furthermore, although the Paris Agreement does
not prescribe particular national commitments,
it does expressly call on national governments
to
make
their
mitigation
commitments
incrementally more stringent and never less so.35
Thus, even if a national government can argue that
it never specified a level of emissions reduction
it cannot argue that its commitments permit
backsliding.

In the Austrian case, petitioners persuaded the
court that authorizing expansion of the Vienna
37 See id. para. 60 (“Mit dem Übereinkommen von Paris haben die
Vertragsstaaten im Dezember 2015 das Ziel, eine «gefährliche Störung
des Klimasystems» zu verhindern, neu definiert. So soll die globale
durchschnittliche Erwärmung der Erdatmosphäre im Vergleich zur
vorindustriellen Zeit auf «deutlich unter 2 Grad Celsius» gehalten werden.
Es sollen Anstrengungen unternommen werden, die Erwärmung auf 1.5
Grad zu begrenzen (Art. 2 Abs. 1 Bst. a Pariser Übereinkommen).”).
38 Id. § 4.3.2 (“[Insufficient measures for the achievement of applicable
reduction goals for 2020”] Ungenügende Massnahmen zur Erreichung des
geltenden Reduktionsziels für 2020.”).
39 Norway ratified the Paris Agreement on June 20, 2016, Sweden on October
13, 2016. UNFCCC, Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, supra note 23.
On the legal relevance of the Paris Agreement to national commitments,
the Norwegian petition states: “The presumption principle, which calls for
Norwegian law to be interpreted in accordance with international law,
makes international law rules and fundamental principles of international
law a part of our national legal system. This means that the Climate
Convention, the Paris Agreement and international human rights and
environmental principles are relevant sources of law when the limitations
in Article 112 of the Constitution are to be determined.” Greenpeace Nordic
Ass’n at 36. On the same point, the Swedish petition states: “98. By signing
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the State has explicitly accepted a duty
of care. In order to fulfil this duty, every individual State must to the highest
extent possible, in accordance with its own circumstances, implement the
best possible measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. * * * 102.
The Swedish climate targets and Sweden’s accession to international
agreements are relevant to the interpretation of these directives. * *
* 110. The scope of the duty of care is determined by a combination of
factors such as Sweden’s accession to international conventions, nationally
adopted environmental goals, environmental legislation, government
statements, etc.”). PUSH Sweden at paras. 98, 102, 110.

A petition filed in Switzerland in October 2016
makes constitutional arguments akin to those made
in Urgenda,36 but buttresses them with reference
to the Paris Agreement. As the petitioners in Union
of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection v. Swiss
Federal Council explain: “[w]ith the Paris Agreement
the parties [to the UNFCCC] defined anew the
32 Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues at paras. 85, 90.
33 Conference of the Parties Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, art. 3 para. 2, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement] (Dec. 12, 2015)
(specifying temperature thresholds basic to Agreement’s objectives),
id. art. 3 para. 3 (parties shall undertake increasingly stringent nationally
determined contributions to mitigation).
34 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 561 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
35 Paris Agreement, art. 3 para. 3.
36 Specifically, the Swiss petitioners ground their claims in articles 10 (right
to life), 73 (sustainability principle), and 74 (precautionary principle) of the
Swiss Constitution, and in articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which Switzerland has ratified. Union of Swiss Senior Women
for Climate Protection v. Swiss Federal Council [Verein KlimaSeniorinnen
Schweiz v. Bundesrat], at para. 1(a) (filed Oct. 25, 2016), https://perma.
cc/3LGB-3V7H.
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Austria
Various NGOs and individuals persuaded a panel
of the Austrian Federal Administrative Court
to overturn the government of Lower Austria’s
approval of construction of a third runway at
Vienna’s main airport. The reason: authorizing
the runway would do more harm to the public
interest than good, primarily because it would
be contrary to Austria’s national and international
obligations to mitigate the causes of climate
change. Of the authorities cited by the court, the
most important was Austria’s Climate Protection
Act of 2011, which set emissions reduction targets
for various sectors, including the transport sector.

Because a third runway was expected to increase
Austria’s annual CO2 emissions, the court concluded
that it would be at odds with the provisions of the
2011 Act as well as with Austria’s constitution and
its international commitments under EU law and
the Paris Agreement.

airport would run afoul of the emissions reductions
targets set forth in Austria’s Climate Protection Law
and contradict Austria’s climate change mitigation
commitments under the Paris Agreement.40 In the
Norwegian petition, the challenged action is issuance
of licenses for deep-sea oil and gas extraction in the
Barents Sea. In the Swedish petition, the challenged
action is the sale (rather than decommissioning) of
coal mines and coal-fired power plants in Germany
by Vattenfall, a state-owned energy company. For
all three groups of petitioners, the Paris Agreement
provides a scientific reference point as well as a
legally definitive constraint.41

energy sources and drilling for oil and gas yield fossil
fuels, the consumption of which emits the GHGs
responsible for climate change. Mining and drilling
also tend to generate large volumes of pollution
in their immediate vicinity, impairing local water
resources’ quality or quantity or both. Recognizing
this, plaintiffs eager for policy to address climate
change have begun to challenge environmental
review and permitting processes that unduly ignore
resource extraction activities’ implications for the
climate.

This case is the first instance of a court determining
that climate change mitigation commitments
require it to overturn government agency
approval of infrastructure development. It is thus a
leading example both of a court straightforwardly
enforcing a climate mitigation statute and of a
court vindicating rights to environmental integrity.

In February 2016 the Constitutional Court in
Colombia held two statutory provisions to be
unconstitutional, preventing regulatory authorities
from ignoring the climate-related costs of resource
extraction. One provision authorized a national
commission to designate particular projects
as being in the national strategic interest—a
designation that would exempt projects
from aspects of local regulatory oversight.43
The other provision is grandfathered in leases
and permits for mining and oil and gas in
sensitive mountain ecosystems (páramos).44
The Colombian court found the provisions
unconstitutional because they endangered the

2.2.2 Linking the impacts of resource extraction
to climate change and resilience
Any thorough catalogue of the activities that result
in GHG emissions or reduce communities’ resilience
to extreme weather events must include resource
extraction.42 Mining for coal and other combustible
40 Austrian Federal Administrative Court case no. W109 2000179-1/291E,
https://perma.cc/6P34-5HYU.
41 Greenpeace Nordic Ass’n at 18–19 (“The Paris Agreement will enter into force
on 4 November 2016. The Agreement will then constitute an international
law obligation for Norway. . . . In addition to its legal content, the Paris
Agreement and the decision document for the Agreement represent a
factual basis in the case.”); PUSH Sweden at 26 (quoting 2014 Statement of
Government Policy regarding emissions reduction goals and upcoming
Paris Conference), 33 (quoting June 2016 statement of Environmental
Objectives Council regarding needed emissions reductions).
42 At issue in the case were Law No. 1450 of 2011, establishing the National
Development Plan 2010–2014, and Law No. 1753 of 2015, establishing

the National Development Plan 2014–2018. The two provisions discussed
here both appeared in the latter.
43 Law No. 1753 of 2015 arts. 49–52.
44 Id. art. 173.
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Colombia
In Decision C-035/16 of February 8, 2016, the
Colombian Constitutional Court struck down as
unconstitutional provisions of Law No. 1450 of 2011
and of Law No. 1753 of 2015 that threatened highaltitude ecosystems, called páramos. The court noted
several important features of páramos, including
their fragility, their lack of regulatory protection,
their role in providing Colombia with as much as
70 percent of its drinking water, and the capacity of
their soils and vegetation to capture CO2 from the
atmosphere.

tropical rainforest. The court decided that statutory
provisions that would have allowed for development
in the páramos were unconstitutional because they
would endanger the public’s right to clean water and
relieve government agencies of their obligation to
justify decisions certain to result in the degradation
of environmentally sensitive and valuable areas.

The court highlighted the last of these features in
particular, calling páramos a “carbon capture system”
and explaining that the carbon capture capacity of
páramos exceeds that of a comparably sized
public’s right to clean water, and they abrogated
government agencies’ obligation to justify
decisions that would result in the degradation
of environmentally sensitive and valuable areas.
Crucially, the court characterized páramos as
valuable both for providing Colombia with much
of its drinking water and because their soils and
vegetation capture CO2 from the atmosphere at
greater rates than a tropical rainforest with similar
acreage.45

The court framed its protection of rights in this
decision as responsive to climatic changes that
would make resources like the water flowing from
páramos even more valuable in the future. It can
thus be read as taking the need for adaptation to
climate change into account when interpreting the
significance of constitutionally protected rights that
do not explicitly reference climate change.
electricity; and of the public trust doctrine as it
relates to Pakistan’s atmosphere and climate. The
Lahore High Court had as of March 2017 not yet
issued a judgment in that case.
The petition in Greenpeace Nordic Association v.
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy similarly argues
that the Norwegian Ministry’s lease of blocks of
the Barents Sea to oil and gas developers violates
constitutional protections. Article 112 of Norway’s
constitution provides that Norwegians have a “right
to an environment that is conducive to health and
to a natural environment whose productivity and
diversity are maintained.” Petitioners allege that
maintenance of that environment requires staying
within a global emissions budget consistent with
the 1.5°C or 2°C warming thresholds recognized by
the Paris Agreement, and that the Barents Sea leases
would allow for the extraction of fossil fuels and
related emission of GHGs in excess of that budget.
That case was also still pending in March 2017.

In Ali v. Federation of Pakistan, the petitioner has
challenged various government actions and
inactions relating to approval of development of the
Thar coal field, which is expected to produce 4.5 to
60 million metric tons of coal annually.46 According
to the petitioner, because of the local environmental
degradation, displacement, and coal-fed GHG
emissions that will result from that development,
its approval amounts to a three-fold violation: of
constitutionally protected “Fundamental Rights”; of
rights relating to the environmental degradation
expected to result from burning coal to generate

2.2.3 Establishing that particular emissions are
the proximate cause of particular adverse
climate change impacts

45 Constitutional Court, Feb. 8, 2016, Decision C-035/16, at para. 142.
46 Ali v. Pakistan, Constitutional Petition No. ___ / I of 2016, at para. xxvi,
https://perma.cc/6AFA-2ZL5; see also Muhammad Imran Rashid et al., Coal
as an Energy Source for Mitigating Energy Crisis in Pakistan, 4 J. ENG. &
TECH. 127, 128–29 (July-Dec. 2014), https://perma.cc/66NK-GZH6.

Although several courts have recognized the
scientific consensus regarding the causal relationship
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Norway
In Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature
& Youth v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
two environmental NGOs filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgment from the Oslo District Court
that Norway’s Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
violated the Norwegian constitution by issuing a
block of oil and gas licenses for deep-sea extraction
from sites in the Barents Sea.
The petition alleges several key facts: the licenses
would allow access to as-yet undeveloped fossil fuel
deposits in a manner inconsistent with the climate
change mitigation required to avert global warming
of 1.5°C and possibly even 2°C in excess of preindustrial levels; and the area made accessible by the
licenses would be the northernmost yet developed,
and would border the ice zone, presenting
extraordinary risks to the highly sensitive Arctic
environment from potential spills and emissions of
black carbon. The petition also alleges violation of
article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution, which
establishes a “right to an environment that is
conducive to health and to a natural environment
whose productivity and diversity are maintained.”

The petition also cites other constitutional
provisions including those requiring government
action to be consistent with the precautionary
principle; the no harm principle as it applies both
domestically and to citizens of other countries;
and human rights protections. In addition to these
national sources of legal authority, the petition also
points out that Norway’s issuance of oil and gas
licenses contradicts its commitments under the
Paris Agreement.
Much as the Urgenda plaintiffs used national
and international commitments to construe the
climate mitigation implications of the duty of
care embodied in the Dutch constitution, this
petition argues for a similar interpretation of the
right to environmental integrity protected by
the Norwegian constitution. It would have been
possible to make a similar argument before Norway
ratified the Paris Agreement and that Agreement
entered into force, but those events lend specificity
and context to the constitutional right at the core
of the petition.

between anthropogenic GHG emissions, climate
change, and the adverse impacts resulting from
climate change,47 no court has yet found that
particular GHG emissions relate causally to particular
adverse climate change impacts for the purpose of
establishing liability. Indeed, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change describes the key
causal mechanism of climate change as “wellmixed greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere.48
Such mixing obscures particular contributions
and makes attribution of harm difficult. Yet the
law generally assigns liability only when particular
contributions can be related to particular effects.

emitters have proximately caused them particular
injuries. The leading U.S. cases are Connecticut v.
American Electric Power and Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.
The Connecticut plaintiffs sought an injunction
capping emissions from power plants;49
the Kivalina plaintiffs sought damages for
their injuries from fossil fuel companies;50
both sets of plaintiffs grounded their claims against
private companies in a theory of public nuisance
under federal common law. In both cases the
courts concluded that the federal Clean Air Act had
displaced federal common law claims, and so did not
reach the substantive question of proximate cause.51

Plaintiffs in the U.S. and Germany have sought—
unsuccessfully, so far—to establish that particular

49 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
50 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
51 Connecticut, 564 U.S. at 415 (“The Clean Air Act and the Environmental
Protection Agency action the Act authorizes, we hold, displace the
claims the plaintiffs seek to pursue.”); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856 (“We need
not engage in that complex issue and fact-specific analysis in this case,
because we have direct Supreme Court guidance. The Supreme Court
has already determined that Congress has directly addressed the issue
of domestic greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources and

47 See, e.g., Urgenda at para. 4.14; Mass. v. EPA at 498; Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 132 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 U.S. 2427 (2014); and Greenpeace New Zealand
v. Northland Regional Council, [2007] NZRMA 87, at para. 7.
48 IPCC AR5, WG1 § 6.3.
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Germany (and Peru)
In November 2015, Saúl Luciano Lliuya, a Peruvian
farmer who lives in Huaraz, Peru, filed a claim for
damages in a German court against RWE, Germany’s
largest electricity producer.

a Huaraz community association with €17,000 for
the purpose of building siphons, drains, and dams
to protect the town. That amount is 0.47 percent of
both (1) the estimated cost of protective measures;
and (2) RWE’s estimated annual contribution to
global GHG emissions.

Lliuya’s suit alleges that RWE, having knowingly
contributed to climate change by emitting
substantial volumes of GHGs, bears some measure
of responsibility for the melting of mountain glaciers
near Huaraz, population 120,000. That melting has
given rise to an acute threat: Palcacocha, a glacial
lake located above Huaraz, has experienced a 30fold volumetric increase since 1975 and a fourfold increase since 2003. Lliuya based his claim on
paragraph 1004 of the German Civil Code, which
provides for nuisance abatement and injunctive
relief. He asked the court to declare that RWE
was partly responsible for the costs arising from
the lake’s growth. He also asked the court to
order RWE to reimburse him for measures he had
already taken to protect his home and to provide

The court dismissed Lliuya’s requests for declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as his request for
damages. The court noted several grounds for its
decision, but none was more important than its
finding that no “linear causal chain” linked RWE’s
emissions to the dangers and costs described by
Lliuya as resulting from melting glaciers. This legal
conclusion goes a step beyond what any other
court, including the U.S. courts that decided the
AEP v. Connecticut and Village of Kivalina cases, has
stated on the question of whether a given entity’s
emissions can be said to have proximately caused
injury via impacts of climate change.

In Lliuya v. RWE AG, Saul Lliuya, a Peruvian farmer,
filed suit in a German court against a German
utility. Lliuya sought damages to offset the costs
of protecting his town from melting glaciers, for
which he alleged RWE is partly responsible.52
Two of the several reasons stated by the court for
dismissing Lliuya’s claim went to causation. The first
reason was evidentiary: the plaintiff had asked the
court to specify RWE’s precise annual contribution to
global emissions rather than submitting an estimate.
The second reason was more emblematic: the court
found that no “linear causal chain” linked the alleged
injury and RWE’s emissions—rather many emitters
had created the risk of flood confronting Lliuya’s
town such that the root cause of the risk could not
be ascribed to RWE in particular.53

In
Greenpeace
Southeast
Asia
et
al.,
environmentalists and Filipino citizens filed a
petition with the Philippine Commission on
Human Rights, a tribunal empowered to investigate
allegations and issue recommendations but
not to issue orders that carry the force of law.54
The petitioners submitted factual allegations
that identify 50 corporations as “Carbon Majors,”
responsible for a cumulative 21.71% of the
anthropogenic GHGs emitted from 1751 to 2010.55The
petitioners also characterize the relationship between
climate change, ocean acidification, and potential
ZEITUNG, Dec. 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/LX3R-7SVE ([“A flood risk would
however not be attributed singly to RWE AG.”] “Eine Flutgefahr wäre
jedoch der RWE AG nicht individuell zuzuordnen.”).
54 Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Human Rights,
http://198.23.173.74/chr/ (accessed Mar. 4, 2017); Greenpeace Southeast
Asia and Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Petition To the
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines Requesting for Investigation
of the Responsibility of the Carbon Majors for Human Rights Violations
or Threats of Violations Resulting from the Impacts of Climate Change
[hereinafter Petition of Greenpeace Southeast Asia], https://perma.cc/2S8RTTKN.
55 Petition of Greenpeace Southeast Asia at 3–4 (citing R. Heede, Carbon Majors:
Accounting for Carbon and Methane Emissions 1854-2010, Methods and
Results Report (Apr. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/CVY4-YANG).

has therefore displaced federal common law. Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct.
at 2530, 2537.”). The closest courts have come to such an answer have
been decisions about standing, for which the bar is lower than “tort-like
causation.” See Mass v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
582 F.3d 309, 346 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011);
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 865 (5th Cir. 2009).
52 Az. 2 O 285/15 Essen Regional Court [2015].
53 [David Loses the Fight Against Goliath], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
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physical and economic harms facing Filipinos.56
Based on these facts and arguments grounded
in international human rights law, the petitioners
requested that the Commission “[c]onduct an
investigation into the human rights implications
of climate change and ocean acidification and
the resulting rights violations in the Philippines,
and whether the investor-owned Carbon
Majors have breached their responsibilities
to respect the rights of the Filipino people.”57
In December 2015 the Commission agreed to
undertake an investigation, which was in progress
as of March 2017.58

or failed to avert foreseeable harms caused by them.
Meanwhile, government-led adaptation measures
have also inspired plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief
or compensation for alleged injury to their property
rights. The following examples from the U.S. and
Australia illustrate each of these types of adaptationrelated case.
In the U.S. the scope of local, state, and national
governments’ sovereign immunity plays a key role
in cases dealing with liability for failure to adapt. 60
Two sets of consolidated cases brought in 2005
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrate
this point: In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation,61
and St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States.62
Both focused on the role of the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet (MRGO) shipping channel in propagating
the hurricane’s storm surge into the city of New
Orleans. Since the Army Corps of Engineers finished
excavating MRGO in 1968, natural wave action,
storms, and the wakes of large ships had caused it
to widen from 500 feet to nearly 2000 feet, such that
by 2005 its banks sat close to levées built to protect
New Orleans neighborhoods from flooding. As with
many cases focused on adaptation, climate change
featured in the background rather than the text of
these cases: A changing climate forces decisions by
public and private actors about how to deal with
shifting shorelines and more frequent and powerful
coastal storms, and it creates uncertainties by pulling
coastlines and weather patterns away from their
historical norms.

In addition to arguing that climate change-related
injuries are proximately caused by particular
emitters, the parties seeking relief in each of these
cases have proposed various ways for tribunals to
apportion responsibility for those injuries among
named defendants and others. The proposals all
resemble the “market share” theory of how to allocate
damages fairly in product liability cases in the U.S.,59
a theory that, notably, has seldom been implemented
successfully. So far, however, no court or tribunal has
endorsed or suggested any approach to establishing
and defining proximate causation in this context.
2.2.4 Establishing liability for failure to adapt
and the impacts of adaptation
As the impacts of climate change have grown in
frequency and severity, plaintiffs have sought redress
for decisions that arguably amplified those impacts

In these cases plaintiffs sought damages
for the effects of the Katrina storm surge
propagated via MRGO into New Orleans under
two distinct theories: that the Corps had been
negligent, and that the Corps’ management
of the channel had effectuated a temporary
uncompensated taking of property damaged in

56 Id. at 13–17.
57 Id. at 30. The petition’s prayer also includes five subsidiary requests, but,
as the petition itself states, “At the heart of this petition is the question
of whether or not the Respondent Carbon Majors must be held
accountable—being the largest corporate contributors of greenhouse
gases emissions and having so far failed to curb those emissions despite
the companies’ knowledge of the harm caused, capacity to do so, and
potential involvement in activities that may be undermining climate
action—for the human rights implications of climate change and ocean
acidification.” Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
58 Greenpeace International, First national human rights investigation into
climate change impacts proceeds despite opposition from fossil fuel
companies, Dec. 8, 2016, https://perma.cc/DDJ3-4UY8.
59 See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) (apportioning
liability to manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol, a synthetic form of estrogen
prescribed to pregnant women to prevent miscarriage, because it was
determined to have caused plaintiff’s cancer but it was impossible to
determine which manufacturer had produced the particular doses that
her mother took while pregnant with her).

60 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Jennifer Klein, Potential Liability of
Governments for Failure to Prepare for Climate Change (Aug. 2015), http://
bit.ly/2jtwRyK.
61 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
62 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015). The Army Corps of Engineers has appealed
this decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. St. Bernard Parish
Government et al. v. United States, Case No. 16-2301 (Fed. Cir.).
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the storm, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.63
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
negligence claim in In re Katrina Canal Breaches,
finding that the waiver of sovereign immunity
provided for by Federal Tort Claims Act did not
extend to the Corps’ management of the MRGO.64
In St. Bernard Parish Government the Federal Court
of Claims accepted that MRGO’s management had
effectuated a temporary taking, a claim to which
sovereign immunity does not apply.

attributable to a failure to adapt to climate change.66
The plaintiffs in that case summarize their chief
concerns about a petroleum products distribution
and bulk storage terminal owned and operated by
ExxonMobil in this way:

The terms “climate change” and “sea level rise”
also do not appear in the New South Wales
Supreme Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
in Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council.65
Yet, the case arose from the Shire Council’s struggle
to decide what to do about the local effects of sea
level rise. Specifically, over the course of several
years, the Council initially proposed a policy of
managed retreat, then withdrew the proposal but
did not formally repudiate it. Meanwhile, residents
were prohibited from armoring their stretches of
shoreline, even though hard shoreline armoring
installed by the Council in the 1960s and 70s was
amplifying erosion on their stretches. These residents
sued to challenge various aspects of the Council’s
land use plans, demanding compensation as well
as authorization to install rock, concrete, and rubble
shoreline barriers to prevent further erosion. After
the court denied the Council’s motion to dismiss
the residents’ claims, the parties settled, leaving
unresolved the question of whether the Council was
liable for the effects of the armoring it had installed
or of its proposed policy of managed retreat.
Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil,
recently filed in the federal district court in Boston,
Massachusetts, is a national and international test
case for the theory that plaintiffs can prevail on
claims arising from the threat of potential injury

“ExxonMobil’s failure to adapt the Everett
Terminal to increased precipitation, rising sea
levels and storm surges of increasing frequency
and magnitude puts the facility, the public
health, and the environment at great risk because
a significant storm surge, rise in sea level, and/
or extreme rainfall event may flood the facility
and release solid and hazardous wastes into the
Island End River, Mystic River, and directly onto
the city streets of Everett.” 67
A decision for the plaintiffs in this case would
create a blueprint for others to follow, identifying
facilities where statutory violations can be used as
leverage to compel adaptation to risks arising from
climate change impacts. Because coastal terminals
like the one in Everett are a commonplace, and
indispensable for the distribution of petroleum
products and natural gas, such a blueprint would
be highly significant and almost certainly generative
of a small wave of litigation. Furthermore, because
private facility owners—unlike governments—lack
the shield of sovereign immunity, fewer legal options
would help them to avoid investing in adaptation
measures.
2.2.5 Applying the public trust doctrine to
climate change
The public trust doctrine is a widely recognized
common law duty on the sovereign of a given
jurisdiction to act as trustee for present and
future generations by maintaining the integrity
of the public trust resources in that jurisdiction.68
66 Complaint, paras. 70–88, Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil
Corp., Case No. 1:16-cv-11950 (D. Mass.), https://perma.cc/P55L-9T9Q. The
plaintiffs also allege violations of the Clean Water Act that do not hinge on
the effects of climate change. Id. paras. 194–96, 200–02, 210.
67 Id. para. 183.
68 See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public
Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches
to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2011-2012)
(surveying applications of doctrine in Asia, Africa, and South America);
see also Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub

63 These theories were not only distinct but also mutually exclusive: whereas
federal district courts had jurisdiction over the first, only the Court of
Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the second. Thus a plaintiff could not
present both even by arguing one in the alternative.
64 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d at 441, cert. denied sub nom.,
Lattimore v. U.S. 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).
65 [2016] NSWSC 169.
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U.S. (Juliana v. United States)
Twenty-one youth plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal
district court against the U.S. government, asking
the court to compel the government to take action
to reduce CO2 emissions so that atmospheric CO2
concentrations will be no greater than 350 parts
per million by 2100. The plaintiffs alleged that
the “nation’s climate system” was critical to their
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property,
and that the defendants had violated their
substantive due process rights by allowing fossil
fuel production, consumption, and combustion at
“dangerous levels.” The plaintiffs also alleged that
the government’s failure to control CO2 emissions
constituted a violation of their constitutional right
to equal protection before the law, as they were

being denied the fundamental rights afforded to
prior and present generations. Finally, the plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had failed to fulfill their
obligations under the public trust doctrine.

Arguments that the doctrine compels governmentled or -supported climate change mitigation and
adaptation efforts have appeared in Ukraine, the
Philippines, Pakistan, and multiple U.S. state and
federal courts.

request that the government help to mitigate
climate change by curtailing motorized vehicle
traffic and enabling bicycle and foot traffic.71
The petitioner in the case of Ali v. Pakistan also cites
the public trust doctrine as a legal basis for her
claims against governmental approval of coal fields
in the Thar Desert because of the foreseeable direct
and indirect environmental degradation that will
ensue.72

This decision contains a novel application of the
public trust doctrine—one that may be overturned
on appeal, but is consistent with an international
groundswell of cases in which litigants have
implicated that doctrine in their challenges to
inadequate government climate change mitigation
or adaptation efforts. At least one court has already
referred to it in support of a decision to invite
plaintiffs to amend their claims to include one
resembling those argued in Juliana.

Plaintiffs seeking application of the doctrine
to climate change mitigation in Ukraine, the
Philippines, and Pakistan have met with modest
success. In Environmental People Law v. Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine a Ukrainian court addressed the
question of whether the Ukrainian government
had a constitutional responsibility to regulate
“air” as a natural resource “on behalf of and for
the people of Ukraine.”69 Though the court held
that the government did have such a duty,
it did not direct the government to do more
than report on its progress toward compliance
with its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.70
In the Philippines, a petition for an extraordinary
writ from the Supreme Court identified the
public trust doctrine as one of the bases for its

In the U.S. various groups of plaintiffs organized by
Our Children’s Trust have argued before multiple
administrative bodies and courts of law that the public
trust doctrine compels state or federal government
action on climate change. There is general consensus
among courts that the proposed application of the
doctrine “represents a significant departure from
the doctrine as it has been traditionally applied,”73
but disagreement on several key issues persists.
One point of disagreement is whether the
public trust doctrine sounds in federal law at
71 Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus, Segovia v.
Climate Change Commission, Special Civil Action No. __, at 23 (S.C. Feb. 17,
2014), https://perma.cc/W7XD-L8HH (“the Trustee—the person or entity
given the trust, i.e. the Government, is duty-bound to properly care for and
manage the thing held in trust – the life-sources of Land, Air and Water for
the people.”).
72 Ali, Constitutional Petition No. ___ / I of 2016.
73 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 13.

nom., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (“traditionally, the doctrine has functioned
as a restraint on the states’ ability to alienate submerged lands in favor of
public access to and enjoyment of the waters above those lands.”).
69 Environmental People Law v. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Kyiv Dist. Admin.
Ct. 2011).
70 Id.
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all, or only in state law.74 Another is whether the
public trust doctrine extends to the atmosphere,
or whether obligations derive from climate
impacts on ocean and coastal resources.75
A third arises from the question of what—assuming
the doctrine does apply to climate change—
the proper role of the courts is in relation to the
legislature and executive.76

predominantly international rather than domestic.79
Nonetheless, the term does convey that climatedriven displacement is in the offing, and does so
in a way that highlights the lack of an existing
legal framework capable of dealing with that
displacement.
A handful of cases in Australia and New Zealand
offer a partial preview of how “climate refugees”
will feature in climate change litigation.80 But the
discussion in those cases of whether climate change
impacts provide legally sufficient cause to authorize
immigration does not presage the full scope of what
we can expect to see as climate change-related
pressures drive rates of intra- and international
migration higher in the coming years and decades.
“Climate refugee” litigation is also likely to arise over
internal disaster recovery and resettlement efforts,
international efforts to facilitate or directly support
resettlement within or outside a country of origin,
and access to resources within and across national
borders amid shifting populations and changing
climates.

2.3 Emerging trends in climate change litigation
Two further trends seem likely to emerge in the
coming years: a growing number of cases dealing
with migrants seeking temporary or permanent
relocation from their home countries or regions
owing at least in part to climate change; and more
climate change litigation in the Global South.
2.3.1

“Climate refugees”

The term“climate refugee”is occasionally used in news
reports and advocacy documents, but it is difficult
to apply it usefully in a legal or practical sense.77
The prevailing legal definition of refugee, established
by the U.N. Refugee Convention, excludes migrants
displaced solely by changes to their environment.78
The term may even be misleading, as it implies that
displacement caused by climate change is or will be

2.3.2

More litigation in the Global South

Several factors suggest that climate change litigation
will appear with increasing frequency in the Global
South. In many instances, this appearance may
owe simply to the steady proliferation of laws
and financial resources focused on mitigation,
adaptation, and sustainable development more
generally. In others, climate change litigation may

74 Compare PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012), and Alec
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) with Juliana v.
United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 WL 6661146, at *23 (D. Or. Nov.
10, 2016).
75 See Chernaik, v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015 WL 12591229, at *6–8 (Or. Cir.
Ct. 2015); Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecol., No. 14-2-25295-1, 2015 WL 7721362,
at *4 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015); Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez,
350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
76 See e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225
(N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014); Funk v. Wolf,
144 A.3d 228, 252 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (“mandamus will not lie because
Petitioners lack a clear right to performance of requested activities, and
that declaratory relief would serve no practical purpose.”).
77 See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 167, 196–200 (2013) (examining critically proposed
legal definitions); Jane McAdam, Why a Climate Change Displacement
Treaty Is Not the Answer, 23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 2, 13 (2011) (“From a
policy perspective, it would seem to be both practically impossible and
conceptually arbitrary to attempt to differentiate between those displaced
people who deserve ‘protection’ on account of climate change, and those
who are victims of ‘mere’ economic of environmental hardship.”).
78 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 33(1),
opened for signature July 28, 1981, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also Jane McAdam
& Ben Saul, An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced
Displacement and International Law, in Human Security and Non-Citizens:
Law, Policy and International Affairs 357 (Alice Edwards & Carla Ferstman
eds. 2010).

79 Most migration triggered by environmental change occurs within
national borders. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Forced
Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States
Under International Law, Submission to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention
(AWG-LCA 6), at 4 (May 20, 2009); see Marta Picchi, Climate Change and
the Protection of Human Rights: The Issue of “Climate Refugees”, 13 U.S.CHINA L. REV. 576, 579 (2016) (“in this essay, the author used the concept
of ‘climate refugees’ to characterize people forced to abandon their place
of origin because of an environmental stressor, regardless of whether or
not they cross an international border.”).
80 Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment, [2015] NZSC 107 (noting relevance of climate change to
decision to immigrate but granting application for visa on other grounds);
In re: AD (Tuvalu), [2014] Cases 501370-371 (New Zealand) (rejecting
application for refugee status); RRT Case Number 0907346, [2009] RRTA
1168, (Refugee Review Tribunal, 10 Dec. 2009) (Australia); Refugee Appeal
No. 72189/2000 (Refugee Status Appeals Authority, S. Joe, Aug. 17, 2000)
(New Zealand).
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follow in the wake of mutually reinforcing national
and international legal developments, such as the
Paris Agreement and national legislation adopted
in pursuit of commitments announced in preAgreement INDCs and post-Agreement NDCs. More
specifically, where REDD+ and the Green Climate
Fund prompt national legislative or regulatory
measures, disputes over those measures and the
resources they govern are likely to follow. Another
factor that seems likely to promote climate change
ligation is more straightforward: the proliferation
and diffusion of climate change litigation knowhow will make it easier to find capable lawyers
with experience arguing tested legal theories,81
particularly because several NGOs stand ready to
provide counsel for such cases. In sum, a growing,
increasingly coherent, and increasingly well-worn
body of law may provide grounds for litigation aimed
at dealing with climate change-related impacts
through mitigation and adaptation efforts.

81 See, e.g., General Secretariat of the Organization of American States,
Climate Change: A Comparative Overview of the Rights Based Approach
in the Americas 61–66 (Nov. 2016), https://perma.cc/LGQ9-MS8U
(summarizing cases adjudicated in the Americas that deal directly or
indirectly with climate change after describing legal background for those
cases).
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Global climate change litigation raises a number
of common issues which recur in numerous
jurisdictions. As an initial matter, courts and
advocates may encounter questions of justiciability,
including questions of standing and separation of
powers principles. Once a court reaches the merits
of justiciable claims, there are a broad range of
potential sources of legal rights and obligations,
including international law, constitutional law,
common law, statutory or legislative law, and
national policy. Finally, courts that find a valid legal
basis for a claim and a violation of the law must still
address the question of remedy. This section details
the ways in which these issues arise at the different
stages of climate change litigation.

question of whether the court is legally empowered
to adjudicate the case – this typically depends on the
constitutional grant of authority to the court. Second
is the question of whether it would be imprudent for
the court to adjudicate the case – the court typically
has discretion to determine this matter based on the
facts before it.
The doctrine of justiciability varies by jurisdiction.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a justiciable
controversy “must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests...It must be a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”83
The English House of Lords has applied a similar
but more general standard for justiciability, holding
that a controversy is non-justiciable if there are “no
judicial or manageable standards” by which to judge
the case.84

3.1 Justiciability
Justiciability refers in general to a person’s ability to
claim a remedy before a judicial body when a violation
of a right has either occurred or is likely to occur.82
The term implies access to appropriate mechanisms
to protect recognized rights. A case is said to be
justiciable in a particular forum if that forum both
is capable of deciding the matter and considers it
appropriate to do so. The justiciability analysis entails
both legal and prudential questions. First is the

While the precise contours of the justiciability
doctrine differ, there are two elements that are
common to many jurisdictions. The first is a
requirement that plaintiffs must have standing to
bring the case. As detailed below, the criteria for

82 International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal Enforcement
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative experiences of
justiciability (2008), https://perma.cc/YU9F-YCNR.

83 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937).
84 Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, at 938.
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U.S. (Mass v. EPA)
A group of states, local governments, and
environmental organizations petitioned for
review of an U.S. EPA order denying a petition for
rulemaking to regulate GHG emissions from motor
vehicles under the U.S. Clean Air Act.

provide a basis for not issuing the endangerment
finding that is grounded in the statute. On remand,
EPA issued a positive endangerment finding that
GHGs from motor vehicles do endanger public
health and welfare.

Two key issues were: (1) whether EPA had statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse emissions under
the Act, and (2) whether EPA could decline to
regulate greenhouse emissions based on policy
judgments that fall outside the scope of the
regulatory considerations outlined in the Act. The
Supreme Court held that EPA did have statutory
authority to regulate because CO2 and other GHGs
fall within the Act’s broad definition of “air pollutant”
and that EPA cannot deny a petition to regulate on
grounds that are not enumerated in the Act. The
court remanded to EPA, instructing the agency to
either issue an endangerment finding for GHGs or

The question of whether the plaintiffs—or
anyone—had standing to sue over EPA’s denial of
a petition for rulemaking was a key point of dispute
in the case, and one emphasized by the dissenting
justices in their explanation of why they would
have decided the case differently. The Court’s
determination that Massachusetts and other states
had standing to sue relied on “the special position
and interest of Massachusetts.” As the Court
explained, “It is of considerable relevance that the
party seeking review here is a sovereign State and
not . . . a private individual.”

standing are closely linked to the principle that there
be a real “case and controversy” and “manageable
standards” to guide the adjudication of the case. The
second is a requirement that the judicial resolution
of the case must not violate the principle of the
separation or balance of powers.

have suffered or will suffer an injury that is caused
by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful behavior, and
that the adjudicating body is capable of providing
a remedy that will eliminate or otherwise mitigate
that injury.

3.1.1

Standing criteria may pose a barrier to climate
change litigation. For example, it may be difficult
for an individual plaintiff to establish an adequate
causal connection between a defendant’s allegedly
unlawful actions or inaction and an injury that is
linked to climate change impacts. This is a particular
challenge in jurisdictions that require plaintiffs
to establish a “particularized injury” for standing
purposes. However, some jurisdictions allow
individuals and groups to sue based on injuries that
are general to the public, thus making it easier for
plaintiffs to pursue climate-related claims.

Standing

The legal definition of“standing,”or locus standi, varies
among countries, and may be more or less open or
restrictive depending on which country and legal
system (civil or common law) one is operating in.85
In essence, the term refers to the criteria one must
satisfy in order to be a party to a legal proceeding.
These criteria are typically aimed at ensuring that
the parties have a sufficient stake in the outcome of
the case and that the claims brought by the parties
are capable of judicial resolution. For example, some
jurisdictions require plaintiffs to show that they

In the U.S., the question of standing has been central
to climate change litigation. In Massachusetts v.
EPA, several states, cities and environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sued the federal
government, challenging the decision not to regulate
GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under the

85 See generally, George Pring & Catherine Pring, Environmental Courts and
Tribunals, in DECISIONMAKING IN ENVTL. L. (L. Paddock, R. Glicksman &
N. Bryner, eds. 2016) (“Standing rules around the world range from very
restrictive to very open”); Matt Handley, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and
American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of
Standing to Sue, 21 REV. LITIG. 97 (2002).
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Clean Air Act. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the
plaintiff states’ special status as quasi-sovereigns
within the federal system, and on their sovereign
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis prospective loss
of coastal land, to find that they had standing to
sue.86 By contrast, in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiff
landowners harmed by Hurricane Katrina lacked
standing to sue fossil fuel and chemical companies
for alleged civil conspiracy because their injuries
were not fairly traceable to the companies’ conduct.87
Specifically, the court found that the causal chain
between the GHG emissions generated by those
companies’ activities and the damages caused by
Hurricane Katrina was too attenuated.

it represents an incremental GHG increase. It is
unnecessary for us to determine where the line
of materiality might be drawn. As we noted in our
introduction, the DGDP is a major power station
that will generate up to 4.2 million tonnes of GHG
per annum over a 30 year projected life cycle and
increase Victoria’s GHG emissions profile by 2.5%
over 2009 levels. In our view, this clearly raises
potential issues of material interest or concern to
all Victorians, and creates an almost unique level
of “affected interests” and standing compared to
the more usual sort of works approval matters
that come before the Tribunal.” 90
The New South Wales Land and Environment Court
reached a similar result in Haughton v Minister for
Planning and Macquarie Generation, holding that the
plaintiff’s suit was prompted not just by “intellectual
or emotional concern,” but by a legally cognizable
“special interest” in the alleged harms.91

Standing battles have not been unique to the
United States. In Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom
of the Netherlands, the Hague District Court held
that Urgenda had standing on its own behalf, due
to a Dutch law which allows non-governmental
organizations to bring a court action to protect the
general interests or collective interests for other
persons, but – “partly for practical reasons” – the 886
individual claimants involved in the suit were not
granted standing separate from that of Urgenda.88
In the Australian case of Dual Gas Pty Ltd. v.
Environment Protection Authority, the Victorian Civil
and Administrative Tribunal found several plaintiffs
who objected to approvals granted to a new power
station, alleging that it would emit GHGs that
contribute to climate change, had standing to sue
under the Environmental Protection Act.89 The court
there explained:

The question of standing to bring climaterelated litigation has received far less attention
from courts in developing countries. For
example, in Leghari v. Pakistan, the High Court of
Pakistan noted that the petitioner was a citizen
seeking to enforce fundamental rights but did
not otherwise discuss the issue of standing.92
In In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal
Pradesh and others, India’s National Green Tribunal
initiated the case on its own, consistent with its prior
interpretation of the authority granted to the court
by statute, and thus standing was not an issue.93
Other cases where standing issues were never
briefed or discussed by the court include Greenpeace
Southeast Asia et al., Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, and the
Colombian case, Decision C-035/16 of February 8,
2016.

“...despite the global nature of the GHG issue, there
must still be a materiality threshold in relation to
the type or size of the works or emissions that
is relevant to whether a person’s interests are
genuinely affected, as opposed to being too
remote or too general. The emission of a few
tonnes of GHG from a small factory in Gippsland
would not in our view give rise to standing under
s 33B(1) to an objector in Mildura even though
86
87
88
89

90 Id. para. 134.
91 [2011] NSWLEC 217, paras. 101–102.
92 Leghari v. Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Supplemental Decision)
at 3.
93 While the authorizing statute (the India National Green Tribunal Act of
2010) does not expressly authorize the tribunal to initiate proceedings
without an application, it does not expressly forbid the tribunal from
doing so, and the tribunal has exercised such suo motu jurisdiciton on
numerous occasions. See Gitanjali Nain Gill, Environmental Justice in India:
The National Green Tribunal and Expert Members, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L.
175 (2016).

Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009).
Urgenda, paras. 1-408, 1-409.
Dual Gas Pty Ltd. v. Environment Protection Authority [2012] VCAT 308.
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3.1.2

Separation or Balance of Powers

Agency to address climate change, had “displaced”
the judiciary’s authority to provide a remedy for such
public nuisance claims.96

The principle of separation or balance of powers
dictates that one branch of government cannot
exceed the authority granted to it by the constitution
or other laws and intrude on the authority of another
branch. While this doctrine is typically evoked as a
matter of constitutional law, it also applies in nonconstitutional systems to the extent that there
are policies, laws and regulations outlining the
respective powers of each branch of government.
The underlying question here is whether the courts
are the appropriate forum to hear and resolve
questions of equity, rights, and obligations in regards
to climate change.

Separation of powers principles were also
addressed by the Hague District Court in Urgenda.97
There, the government defendant argued that the
remedy sought by plaintiffs (a court order requiring
the State to limit GHG emissions) would violate the
separation of powers doctrine by taking a decision
that should be left to democratically elected leaders
and placing it in the hands of the judiciary. The court
disagreed, finding that Dutch law actually requires
the judiciary to assess the actions of political bodies
when the rights of citizens are at stake, even if the
resolution of the case has political outcomes. The
court explained that Urgenda’s claim “essentially
concerns legal protection [of rights]” and therefore
requires judicial intervention.98

Separation of powers principles have factored
prominently in U.S. climate change litigation.
Standing, discussed just above, reflects separation
of powers concerns, as courts ostensibly invoke the
doctrine in order to limit themselves to exercising the
judicial power, rather than the legislative or executive
powers reserved for other branches of government.
However, separation of powers principles also take
on other forms. In Connecticut v. AEP a federal district
court judge in New York concluded that climate
change was a “patently political” and “transcendently
legislative” issue, and that the political question
doctrine barred the court from hearing the case.94

This aspect of the Urgenda decision is not surprising:
generally speaking, the adjudication of disputes
concerning constitutional or human rights falls
squarely within the powers of the judicial branch.
Indeed, there are other climate change cases
involving the protection of constitutional and human
rights where courts have exercised jurisdiction over
rights-related disputes without even discussing the
separation of powers doctrine, presumably because
there is no dispute that such disputes fall within
the courts’ domain. These cases include Leghari v.
Federation of Pakistan, In re Court on its own motion v.
State of Himachal Pradesh and others, and Gbemre v.
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this
aspect of the decision, concluding that regulation
of climate change-causing emissions was not
an inherently political question, and that the
court was well within its purview to hear a public
nuisance suit against GHG emissions sources.95
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually declined to hear
the substantive claims, for a somewhat different
reason, though one also premised in separation of
powers concerns. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that Congress, in enacting the federal Clean Air Act
and authorizing the U.S. Environmental Protection

3.2 Sources of Legal Rights and Obligations
Once a matter is determined to be justiciable and
a court has jurisdiction to hear the matter, the case
turns to the substantive merits. As climate change
litigation has expanded attorneys and judges have
engaged with a multiplicity of legal theories relying
on a variety of sources of legal rights and obligations.
96 Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. at 415; see also Kivalina, 696 F.3d
at 856 (finding that plaintiffs’ federal common law claims pertaining to
climate change had been displaced by the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions under the Clean Air Act).
97 Urgenda, paras. 4.94-4.107
98 Id. para. 4.98.

94 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
95 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Philippines
Greenpeace Southeast Asia and numerous other
organizations and individuals filed a petition
asking the Philippine Human Rights Commission
to investigate a general issue—“the human
rights implications of climate change and ocean
acidification and the resulting rights violations
in the Philippines”—and a more specific one—
“whether the investor-owned Carbon Majors have
breached their responsibilities to respect the rights
of the Filipino people.”

It identifies multiple sources of human rights,
but draws most heavily on the UN Human Rights
Commission’s Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights. Responses submitted by those
entities have either implied or stated explicitly
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction or authority
to compel answers from them to Greenpeace’s
petition.
Like Lliuya v. RWE, this investigation focuses on
whether the law should attach liability to the causal
relationship between the act of emitting GHGs
and the adverse climate impacts that eventually
result. However, because the Commission’s
authority is limited to investigating and issuing
recommendations, the stakes are somewhat lower.

The core factual allegation of the petition draws
on research identifying particular entities’ quantum
of responsibility for anthropogenic GHG emissions
since 1751. The petition names 50 of those entities,
all publicly traded corporations, as respondents.
3.2.1
3.2.1.1

International law

American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
requesting relief for human rights violations
resulting from the impacts of global warming and
climate change. The petition alleged that the U.S.—
the largest cumulative emitter of GHG emissions at
that time—had violated the Inuit’s human rights
by failing to adopt adequate GHG controls.101
Although the Commission never issued a decision,
the petition did succeed in drawing public attention
to the severe effects of global warming on the Inuit
and instigating further discussion about the human
rights implications of climate change.102

Human rights

The core international human rights treaties do not
recognize a freestanding right to a clean environment,
or to a stable climate. However, it has long been
recognized that inadequate environmental
conditions can undermine the effective enjoyment
of other enumerated rights, such as the rights to
life, health, water, and food. Consistent with this
recognition, the right to a clean environment
has been codified in international human rights
treaties, soft law instruments, regional human rights
agreements, national constitutions, and sub-national
constitutions.99 The relationship between human
rights and climate change has been more recently
the subject of attention from a variety of bodies.100
The climate change and human rights discourse was
instigated in large part by litigation.

In a less well-known decision from that same year
the Federal Court of Nigeria in Gbemre v. Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd
held that Shell’s flaring of methane from its gas
production activities on the Niger Delta violated
101 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global
Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7,
2005) [hereinafter Inuit Petition]. The Inuit live in arctic regions of Alaska,
Canada, Greenland, and Russia that have experienced especially rapid
and disruptive climate change impacts, including significantly warmer
temperatures than normal, reduced sea ice, higher rates of coastal erosion,
and disruptions to ecosystems that affect food chains. Duane Smith,
Climate Change In The Arctic: An Inuit Reality, UN Chronicle, Vol. XLIV No. 2
(June 2007).
102 Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate
Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007).

In December 2005, the Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference submitted a petition to the Inter99 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://perma.cc/N45M-3VES.
100 See generally UNEP, Climate Change and Human Rights (2016), https://
perma.cc/BF65-E7UP.
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human rights to a clean and healthy environment
protected under the Nigerian constitution and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.103
The contribution of GHGs to global climate change
was among the allegations recognized by the court.

Zealand courts, arguing that the effects of climate
change on Kiribati, namely rising ocean levels and
environmental degradation, are forcing citizens
off the island. The Supreme Court of New Zealand
concluded that climate-induced displacement did
not qualify the applicant for refugee status under
international human rights law, including the 1951
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. The Court noted, however, that its decision
does not rule out the possibility “that environmental
degradation resulting from climate change or
other natural disasters could . . . create a pathway
into the Refugee Convention or protected person
jurisdiction.”105

More recently, international human rights law has
been both the subject of and an element within
climate change litigation. In Greenpeace Southeast
Asia et al., environmentalists and Filipino citizens
have petitioned the Philippine Commission on
Human Rights to investigate whether a group of
“Carbon Majors” have violated Filipinos’ human
rights under domestic and international law.104
In Urgenda, the plaintiffs alleged the Dutch
government’s backsliding on its GHG emissions
commitment violated, among other things, human
rights protected under international law. The Hague
District Court did not adopt that argument, but did
refer to international human rights law in reaching its
determination that there had been a violation of the
government’s duty of care. In Leghari v. Pakistan the
Lahore High Court Green Bench reached a similar
conclusion. Plaintiffs in similar suits brought in
Norway, Belgium, and Switzerland have also alluded
to international human rights and obligations.
3.2.1.2

In re: AD was another case before the New Zealand
courts, in which a family from Tuvalu appealed after
they were denied resident visas, similarly arguing that
they would be at risk of suffering the adverse impacts
of climate change if they were deported to Tuvalu.106
Pursuant to the Immigration Act 2009, the New
Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal
found that the family had established “exceptional
circumstances of a humanitarian nature, which would
make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to
be removed from New Zealand.” However, while the
Tribunal acknowledged that climate change impacts
may affect enjoyment of human rights, it explicitly
declined to reach the question of whether climate
change provided a basis for granting resident visas in
this case, and instead based its finding of “exceptional
circumstances” on other factors, including the
presence of the husband’s extended family in New
Zealand, the family’s integration into the New Zealand
community, and the best interests of the children.

Refugee law

In the coming decades, climate change will displace
millions of people from their homes. Current
estimates of the number of “climate refugees” and
“environmental migrants” by 2050 range from 25
million to 1 billion people, and the number could soar
still higher later in the century if GHG emissions are
not seriously reduced. Yet, there is no international
agreement on the rights of persons displaced by
climate change or the obligations of countries with
respect to them. A couple of early cases from New
Zealand preview how courts may approach such
cases.

3.2.2

The Right to a Clean or Healthy Environment

Nations around the world have assured their
citizens of a constitutional right to a clean or healthy
environment. According to a 2012 survey, there are
at least 92 countries that have granted constitutional
status to this right, and a total of 177 countries
recognize the right through their constitutions,
environmental legislation, court decisions, or

In Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of
Business, Innovation and Employment a Kiribati citizen
appealed the denial of refugee status to the New
103 Gbemre v. Shell, FHC/B/CS/53/05.
104 Petition of Greenpeace Southeast Asia, supra note 53.

105 [2015] NZSC 107, para. 13.
106 [2014] NZIPT 501370-371.
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India
accessible via the Rohatang Pass. This area is marked
by melting glaciers and deforestation, and the NGT
concluded that the emission of black carbon from
vehicle traffic is a chief cause of the glacial melting.
The NGT concluded both that global warming
heightens the need to take protective measures of
a region sensitive to emissions and deforestation,
and that that “there is a need to tackle global
warming” in order to avert the sort of environmental
degradation at issue in the case.

In In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal
Pradesh and others, India’s National Green Tribunal
(NGT) Principal Bench in New Delhi acted sua
sponte under the authority granted it by its enabling
statute and ordered authorities in Himachal
Pradesh to undertake several measures to protect
against environmental harms made more likely
and extreme by climate change. The primary legal
basis for the NGT’s decision is Article 21 of India’s
constitution, which provides for a fundamental
right to what the NGT calls a “wholesome, clean,
decent environment.”
The NGT concluded that the government of
Himachal Pradesh had violated its obligations
under article 21 and other provisions by failing
to restrict development and road and pedestrian
traffic in and around the increasingly touristed area

As with the Colombian case, this decision applies
a law not written to address climate change in
a way that compels governments to support
and encourage more effective climate change
adaption efforts. Its holding is thus rooted in
rights that the court views as being compromised
by a combination of changing environmental
circumstances and government inaction.

ratification of an international agreement.107
Courts around the world have begun to reckon with
the implications of this right in the age of climate
change.

from the Oslo District Court that Norway’s Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy violated the Norwegian
constitution by issuing a block of oil and gas licenses
for deep-sea extraction from sites in the Barents Sea.

In In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal
Pradesh and others, India’s National Green Tribunal
Principal Bench in New Delhi invoked constitutional
protection of the environment and ordered
authorities in Himachal Pradesh to undertake
several measures to protect against environmental
harms made more likely and extreme by climate
change.108 In Decision C-035/16 of February 8,
2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court struck
down as unconstitutional statutory provisions
that threatened high-altitude ecosystems, called
páramos, which are known not only to provide
water but also to sequester carbon dioxide.109
In Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature & Youth
v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy two environmental
NGOs filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment

Other cases that have invoked a constitutional or
domestic right to a clean or healthy environment
include: the Austrian Federal Administrative Court’s
rejection in February 2017 of a third runway at Vienna
airport (noting that constitutions of Austria and the
region of Lower Austria both enshrine commitments
to sustainability and environmental protection),
Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria Ltd (finding that Shell’s gas flaring violated
the constitutionally protected right to a “pollutionfree and healthy environment”), and Leghari v.
Federation of Pakistan (finding that government’s
failure to prepare for and respond to climate change
violated the constitutionally protected right to a
“healthy and clean environment”). As discussed
above, there are other cases where plaintiffs alleged
violations of other types of rights – such as the right
to life – but these cases did not entail allegations of a
domestically protected right to a clean environment.

107 David Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment, ENV’T SCI.
& POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., July-Aug. 2012.
108 State of Himachal Pradesh, M.A. Nos. 389/2014, 1145/2015, 1250/2015,
324/2016 & 325/2016 (Nat’l Green Tribunal).
109 Constitutional Court, Feb. 8, 2016, Decision C-035/16.
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Thus far, however, very few countries have seen
fit to address climate change constitutionally. The
Dominican Republic’s constitution is unusual for
doing so. Under “The Organization of the Territory,”
that constitution provides for a “plan of territorial
ordering that assures the efficient and sustainable use
of the natural resources of the Nation, in accordance
with the need of adaptation to climate change…”110
The constitution of Tunisia does so as well.111
Constitutional provisions like these can provide
governments with uniquely important foundations
and persistent motivation to enact and implement
policies that address climate change and its impacts.
International agreements like the Paris Agreement
and the Marrakech Accord of 2016 cannot substitute
for such provisions, even in combination with the
national laws that implement nationally determined
contributions.
3.2.3

Common law: Tort, Nuisance and Negligence

Common law jurisdictions recognize causes of action
for tort, nuisance, and negligence cases, all of which
are gradually developed and refined through case
law. Plaintiffs in these jurisdictions have begun to
use these as a basis for bringing lawsuits pertaining
to the damage caused by climate change – the
idea being that a government or private actor that
contributes to climate change is committing a tort,
causing a nuisance, or behaving negligently and the
plaintiff should therefore be entitled to some form of
judicial relief for the damages caused by that unlawful
behavior. Civil law jurisdictions may recognize similar
causes of action within their respective legal codes
– the Dutch code, for example, recognizes that the
government owes a duty of care to its citizens, and
this was the basis for the Urgenda decision discussed
above.

by climate change, but have had very little success to
date. One key barrier to these claims is the doctrine
of displacement, whereby statutory and regulatory
codifications of law displace the common law when
the codification speaks directly to the question at
issue (thus eliminating any common law cause of
action). In AEP v. Connecticut, plaintiff states, cities
and NGOs claimed that the CO2 emissions from
four private power companies and the Tennessee
Valley Authority contribute to global warming
and therefore constitute a public nuisance under
federal law, and sought an injunction ordering the
companies to lower their emissions. The U.S. Supreme
Court determined that any existing federal common
law cause of action had been displaced by the
Clean Air Act, which authorizes EPA to regulate GHG
emissions from power plants and other sources.112
In Native Village of Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit
extended this holding to a federal public nuisance
claim against a number of energy producers—
including ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron and other
fossil fuel companies—for climate change
damages associated with defendants’ activities.113
Notably, plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina
alleged that direct emissions associated with the
energy companies’ operations contributed to
climate change—they did not address indirect, or
downstream, emissions associated with defendants’
extractive activities, such as those that would be at
issue in a case against federal agencies for mineral
leasing.
Common law suits also face challenges associated
with the difficulty of establishing a causal connection
between the defendant’s actions and an injury to
the plaintiff. In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, plaintiff
property owners alleged that certain power and
chemical companies’ GHG emissions contributed
to climate change, which in turn exacerbated the
harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, constituting
a private nuisance (as well as a public nuisance,
trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
misrepresentation
and
civil
conspiracy).114

However, the theories of tort, nuisance, and
negligence are not available in civil law jurisdictions
as a general matter. U.S. plaintiffs have pursued
several common law actions based on injuries caused

112 Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at 424.
113 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
114 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010), petition for
writ of mandamus denied sub nom. In re Comer, 562 U.S. 1133 (2011).

110 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, art. 194, https://perma.cc/ZCJ8VGGK (accessed Feb. 21, 2017).
111 Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014 (translated by the Constitution Project) art.
45, https://perma.cc/4RFF-TXZT.
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Australia
In Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council a group of
plaintiffs who own property along Belongil Beach in
New South Wales, Australia sought damages from
the local government authority, the Byron Shire
Council, to cover the costs of erecting shoreline
protections on their parcels and to compensate
for lost value to their properties from encroaching
seas. The plaintiffs alleged that the need for
those protections and the cause of the properties’
partial loss of value was the fault of the Council,
which years before constructed a form of hard
shoreline armoring. The plaintiffs argued that the
Council was negligent for installing hard shoreline
armoring that displaced wave action to plaintiffs’
adjacent portions of beach, worsening erosion
there; or, alternatively, that the council’s armoring
constitutes an instance of public nuisance.
After the plaintiffs’ suit survived a motion to dismiss
in March 2016, the Council’s insurers, who had
been steering the defense in the case, agreed to

a settlement that bars the Council from removing
existing coastal armoring (chiefly rock, concrete,
and rubble barriers) on the plaintiffs’ parcels unless
the plaintiffs agree to such removal. If the plaintiffs
want to add to that armoring, they must apply
within one year of the settlement, dated August
2016. They must then make the requested additions
within one year of approval of their application.
Any subsequent repairs or additions may only
be proposed after 20 years, and the Council has
not guaranteed that such proposals would be
approved.
This case illustrates how common law claims can
be wielded in opposition to adaptation efforts. It
is very likely a harbinger of the large number of
similar disputes that can be expected to arise as
governments stumble forward in efforts to facilitate
or compel retreat from coastlines threatened by
rising sea levels and increasingly powerful coastal
storms.
In Macquerie Generation v. Hodgson, a case from
Australia, the plaintiff claimed that the license for
a coal-fired power plant should be interpreted as
containing a common law condition which limited
the plant’s CO2 emissions to the level that would
be achieved by exercising reasonable care for the
environment. The lower court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, but this decision was reversed on appeal.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the plaintiff
could not prevail because they had not alleged
that the CO2 emissions from the plant actually
caused a nuisance, and there was no independent
legal basis for interpreting the license as containing
an implied limitation on CO2 emissions.116
In dicta, the court also suggested that it would be
difficult to have an actionable nuisance based on
CO2 emissions “because CO2 is colourless, odourless
and inert.”117

The case involved a convoluted procedural history,
featuring a dismissal in district court, a reversal
at the Fifth Circuit, an en banc decision to vacate
the reversal due to failure to muster a quorum,
plaintiffs’ filing of a writ of mandamus asking the
Supreme Court to reinstate the panel decision,
the denial of the writ, plaintiffs’ re-filing of their
case in district court, and dismissal based on res
judicata grounds – though not on the merits.115
As noted earlier, the case was ultimately rejected on
standing grounds, because the plaintiffs could not
establish that their injuries were fairly traceable to
the companies’ GHG emissions. If such a case were
to proceed to trial, plaintiffs would have an even
higher burden to satisfy in showing the activities
caused the harm.
Problems confronting common law causes of
action are, again, not limited to the United States.

Another case, Lliuya v. RWE AG, was dismissed on
grounds similar to those articulated in Comer v.

115 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 855–68 (S.D. Miss.
2012) (dismissing re-filed complaint on preemption, political question,
standing, res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460
(5th Cir. 2013).

116 Macquerie Generation v. Hodgson, [2011] NSWCA 424, at paras 35–67.
117 Id. para 45.
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Murphy Oil USA. There, a Peruvian farmer alleged that
the GHG emissions generated by a large German
utility constituted a nuisance under German law.
The farmer sought damages to offset the costs
of protecting his town from melting glaciers; the
damages requested (0.47 percent of the estimated
cost of protective measures) corresponded with
the company’s annual contribution to global GHG
emissions (also 0.47 percent). The court rejected the
claim, in part because it found that there was no
“linear causal chain” linking the alleged injury to the
company’s emissions.118

same infrastructure effectuated a temporary taking,
a claim to which sovereign immunity does not apply.
3.2.4

Statutory authority and national policy

In a number of instances, statutes or national
policies have codified climate change obligations
for private and public actors, and disputes have then
arisen over those obligations’ legality, applicability,
or implementation.
In the European Union the development of the EU
Emissions Trading System (ETS) under the Kyoto
Protocol led to a number of cases, both before EU
courts and in national courts. The majority of EU ETS
cases were challenges to the scheme and subsequent
regulations. There were several lawsuits filed against
the Directive establishing the scheme, challenging
its applicability to certain sectors or countries.120
When legislation was passed in 2008 to incorporate
aviation emissions in the EU into the Scheme,
another suit was initiated by the aviation industry.121
Numerous other suits were filed during and after
the process of Member States’ development of
National Allocation Plans (NAPs).122 In Spain, for
example, at least eleven cases arose out of Spain’s
implementation of the EU ETS through Royal Decree
1866/2004, which approved its NAP for the 20052007 period. Sources challenged their assignment
of emissions credits in the NAP and requested an
increase in emissions allowances.123

Plaintiffs have also begun to use common law
claims to hold government actors accountable for
failure to prepare for and adapt to climate change.
In Ralph Lauren 57 v. Byron Shire Council a group of
property owners in New South Wales, Australia
sought damages from the local government
authority to cover the costs of erecting shoreline
protections on their parcels and to compensate for
lost value to their properties from encroaching seas.
The two legal theories advanced by the property
owners to support their claim were: (i) that the
local government was negligent for installing hard
shoreline armoring that has since displaced wave
action to their properties, worsening erosion and
causing damage, and (ii) that the shoreline armoring
constituted a public nuisance. The lawsuit survived a
motion to dismiss, but was ultimately settled before
it could be resolved on the merits. In In re Katrina
Canal Breaches, property owners sought damages
from the U.S. government for its management of
water management infrastructure, arguing that
the government’s negligent management of the
channel had contributed to damages caused by
Hurricane Katrina.119 Plaintiffs in that case were
denied a remedy based on the government’s
sovereign immunity from a negligence claim. But
in St. Bernard Parish Government the Federal Court
of Claims found that the same management of the

In the U.S., significant litigation has taken place under
the federal Clean Air Act, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act.
The first Clean Air Act case was Massachusetts v.
EPA, where the Supreme Court held that GHGs fell
120 Société Arcelor v. Premier Minister, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-09895
(dismissing challenge of Directive 2003/87/EC under the principle of
equality); Arcelor SA v. Parliament, Case T-16/04 [2010] E.C.R. II-00211,
(dismissing a challenge of Directive 2003/87/EC on the basis that is
violated several principles of common law); Poland v. Commission, Case
T-183/07, [2009] E.C.R. II-03395 (dismissing challenge of Directive 2003/87/
EC).
121 Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change, No.
C-366/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-13755 (challenging U.S. airlines’ inclusion in EU’s
Emission Trading Scheme).
122 European Commission, Climate Action: National Allocation Plans, https://
perma.cc/P4ZW-7RLQ (accessed Mar. 4, 2017).
123 E.g., Judgment No. 5347/2008 of October 6, 2008, Supreme Court of Spain,
Administrative Litigation Division (Section 5) Appeal No. 100/2005.

118 David verliert den Kampf gegen Goliath, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Dec. 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/X6WQ-LVJ3 (“Eine Flutgefahr
wäre jedoch der RWE AG nicht individuell zuzuordnen.”).
119 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d at 441, cert. denied sub nom.,
Lattimore v. U.S. 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).
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within the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air pollutant”
and thus the EPA had the authority to regulate them
(as well as a corresponding obligation to determine
whether regulation was necessary to protect the
public health and welfare). Since that decision, there
have been a variety of lawsuits challenging both the
Clean Air Act regulations that EPA has promulgated
respecting the control of GHG emissions124
as well as EPA’s failure to promptly issue regulations
for certain sources of GHGs.125
The cases brought under NEPA involve federal
agencies’ obligation to consider climate change
when conducting environmental reviews for federal
projects. There have been a number of successful
NEPA cases asserting that these agencies failed
to account for the full scope of GHG emissions
associated with projects – for example, GHG
emissions from the combustion of coal that will be
produced as a result of a federal coal mining permit.126
Litigants have also begun to use NEPA to challenge
agency failures to adequately account for the effects
of climate change on the project and its surrounding
environment – but thus far, there have not been
any decisions overturning a federal environmental
review on these grounds.127
Finally, the Endangered Species Act has provided
a basis for legal challenges where federal agencies
have failed to account for climate change when
making decisions about the listing and conservation
of threatened and endangered species. Most of the
courts overseeing these cases have held that the

current and future effects of climate change must be
considered when deciding whether to list a species
and determining that species’ critical habitat.128
Australian climate change litigation has been largely
dominated by cases surrounding environmental
impact assessment (EIA) and environmental
permitting.129 These cases generally arise in the context
of Australia’s federal and state EIA and planning laws,
particularly the New South Wales Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 and the
Victoria Planning and Environmental Act of 1987.
Some cases have focused on permitting emissions
sources, frequently with the aim of preventing coalfired energy production through targeting proposed
coal mines and power generation facilities.130
While Australian state courts have generally
agreed that direct GHG emissions should be
considered in the permitting process, they
have not usually found emissions sufficient
to justify rejection of a proposed project,131
and they have diverged in regards to
indirect,
or
“downstream,”
emissions.132
Other cases have focused on whether proposed
construction projects adequately accounted for
future climate change impacts and the proper
role for “reverse EIA”—assessment of the potential
impacts of climate change on a proposed project—
in permitting.133
South Africa, as of March 2017, provides another
example of a country where EIAs must consider
climate change. That follows from the South African
High Court’s rejection of approval for development of
a coal-fired power plant on the grounds that climate

124 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1306 (D.C. Cir.); North Dakota v. EPA, No. 151381 (D.C. Cir.); Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, No. 16-1005 (D.C. Cir.).
Summaries and pleadings for each of these cases are available from the
Sabin Center-Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer U.S. Climate Change Litigation
database: http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/.
125 Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, No. 16-1005 (D.C. Cir.); Center for Biological
Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Summaries and pleadings for
each of these cases are available from the Sabin Center-Arnold & Porter
Kaye Scholer U.S. Climate Change Litigation database: http://wordpress2.
ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/.
126 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse
Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 2016; Jessica Wentz, Climate Change and Environmental Impact
Assessment, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVTL. L. vol II 283 (Michael Faure
general ed. 2016).
127 See Jessica Wentz, Considering the Effects of Climate Change on Natural
Resources in Environmental Review and Planning Documents Guidance
for Agencies and Practitioners (Sept. 2016),

128 See id.
129 Wilensky, supra note 12, at 153–57.
130 In Terminals Pty Ltd. v. Greater Geelong City Council, [2005] VCAT 1988, local
residents challenged the permitting of a chemical storage facility. All other
cases within the category were challenges to proposed coal mines or coalfired power plants.
131 E.g., Re Australian Conservation Foundation, [2004] 140 LGERA 100 (holding
that the assessment panel must consider the impacts of GHG emissions
on the environment); Greenpeace v Redbank Power, [1994] 86 LGERA 143,
153-55 (finding that the project should be approved despite climate
change impacts).
132 See Gray v. Minister for Planning [2006] 152 LGERA 258; Xstrata Coal
Queensland v Friends of the Earth [2012] QLC 013.
133 See, e.g., Taip v. East Gippsland Shire Council, [2010] VCAT 1222 (holding that
EIA must consider expected impacts of climate change—chiefly sea level
rise—on area subject to planning scheme amendment).
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South Africa
South Africa’s High Court was recently asked
to determine whether, under the National
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998,
“relevant” considerations for environmental
review of plans for the 1200 megawatt, coal-fired
Thabametsi Power Project include the project’s
impacts on the global climate and the impacts
of a changing climate on the project. Notably,
the project would operate until about 2060. The
court, after observing that the statute does not
expressly contemplate climate change, held that
such considerations are nonetheless relevant and
that their absence from the environmental review
of the project made its approval unlawful. The
court cited several reasons, including South Africa’s
commitments under the Paris Agreement, for its
conclusion that climate change is indeed a relevant
consideration for the environmental review of the

Thabametsi Project. Because the review approved
by the Minister of Environmental Affairs effectively
ignored climate change, the court held it to be
legally invalid.

change and its impacts are relevant considerations
for the EIA of such a project.

Court referred to Pakistan’s 2012 National Climate
Policy and Framework and determined that the
government’s failure to implement that framework
violated the fundamental rights of Pakistani citizens.
There, the existing policy framework provided
the basis both for evaluating the lawfulness of
government action (or, more accurately, inaction)
and for specifying a remedy (the full and expedient
implementation of the framework).

This case will likely have substantive as well as
procedural significance. By holding that at least some
South African environmental reviews conducted
pursuant to the 1998 National Environmental
Management Act must consider climate change
and its impacts, the court has not only declared
those factors “relevant” to environmental reviews
but—owing to South Africa’s commitments under
the Paris Agreement and Marrakech Accord—has
also created a substantive hurdle that may prevent
the Department of Environmental Affairs from
authorizing a project found to have significant and
adverse climate impacts.

In some instances, and in an increasing number of
them, countries have adopted national climate laws
or policies that can provide a basis for litigation.
For example, the Austrian federal administrative
court’s recent rejection of a proposal to expand
Vienna airport grounded that decision firmly on the
numeric GHG emissions reduction requirements
imposed by Austria’s 2011 Climate Protection Act on
the transportation sector.134 Similarly, in Thomson v.
Minister for Climate Change Issues, petitioners alleged
that the country’s INDC was inadequate because
it fell short of what was required by New Zealand’s
Climate Change Response Act 2002. The purpose of
the Act, which was to “enable New Zealand to meet
its international obligations under the [UNFCCC],”
provided the domestic legal hook that was needed to
bring the legal challenge with respect to the INDC.135
In Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, the Lahore High
134 See Klimaschutzgesetz [Climate Protection Act], Bgbl. I Nr. 106, 4 (Nov.
2011), https://perma.cc/2HR2-VB5Q.
135 Climate Change Response Act 2002 § 3(1)(a).

3.2.5

Hybrid Approaches: Duty of Care and Public
Trust

Some sources of legal rights and obligations
incorporate constitutional, common law and
statutory elements. For example, in Urgenda, the
Hague District Court found that the government
must “do more to avert the imminent danger caused
by climate change” because it owed its citizens a
“duty of care to protect and improve the living
environment.”136 This duty was codified in the Dutch
constitution, but a similar duty also exists in common
law, as the concept of “negligence” is typically
defined as a breach of the duty of due care owed to
136 Urgenda, at 1 (summary)
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another person. The court explicitly recognized this
link, noting that it must consider whether there had
been an “unlawful hazardous negligence on the part
of the State” to determine whether the State had
breached its duty.

informed by constitutional and statutory provisions
– for example, constitutional provisions requiring
the government to protect or manage resources in
the public interest. Through the Our Children’s Trust
litigation, several suits have alleged that failure to
mitigate climate change breaches government’s
duty under the public trust doctrine. Public trust
claims have also been filed in Pakistan, Philippines,
and Ukraine. (See Section 2.2.5.)

The approach adopted in Urgenda can be and is
being adapted to other jurisdictions that have
also imposed a “duty of care” on government
actors. Indeed, litigants have filed a similar case in
Sweden, PUSH Sweden, Nature & Youth Sweden, et al. v.
Government of Sweden, which alleges that the national
government has breached its duty of care towards
the citizens by allowing a state-owned company
to divest from (rather than decommissioning) coal
mining and coal power assets. The complaint notes
that “[t]he scope of the duty of care is determined by
a combination of considerations such as Sweden’s
accession to international conventions, nationally
adopted environmental goals, environmental
legislation, [and] government statutes”137 as well as
the Swedish constitution.138

3.3 Remedies/Targets
The cases discussed in the preceding sections,
and profiled in the next, illustrate that global
climate change litigation in some instances seeks
conventional remedies, but in others seeks remedies
of a dramatically unconventional scale and scope.
The conventional remedies include declaratory
judgments on the legality of contested actions or
inactions, injunctions to undertake certain actions
or to halt others, and the imposition of liability and
award of damages for harms suffered by plaintiffs.139
Unconventional remedies include injunctions aimed
at changing basic features of national energy and
transportation policy.140

The use of the public trust doctrine can also be
thought of as a hybrid approach to litigation: it is
primarily a common law doctrine, but it may also be

139 See, e.g., Lliuya v. RWE AG.
140 See, e.g., Urgenda, Ali v. Republic of Pakistan.

137 Id. para. 95.
138 Id. para. 92.
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Litigation has emerged as an important feature
of ongoing efforts to promote climate change
mitigation and adaptation efforts. This owes in
large part to the growing number of national laws
that address climate change directly and so provide
toeholds for litigants seeking to hold governments
and private actors to account for obligations to
mitigate or adapt. It also owes to the cohering
role played by the Paris Agreement, which puts
national laws and policies into a global context and
thereby enables litigants to construe governments’
commitments and actions as being adequate
or inadequate. As climate change litigation has
proliferated, it has addressed a widening scope of
activities, ranging from coastal development to

infrastructure planning to resource extraction—in
effect tracing through legal efforts the long and
varied list of ways in which climate change affects
ecosystems, societies, and individuals’ rights and
interests. It has also encountered a growing list of
legal issues, such as the causal showing required to
establish liability and the relevance of the public trust
doctrine to governments’ approaches to climate
change mitigation and adaptation. In addition to
proliferating, climate change litigation also seems
to be growing in ambition and effectiveness: cases
across the world provide examples of litigants
holding governments to account for the actions or
inactions that bear upon those litigants’ rights amid
changes to weather and coastlines.
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